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LITTLE-KNOWN PAGES OF MARX' AMERICANA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 3-9

[Article by Karl Marx: "On the Subject of Carey," edited and annotated by V. A. Smirnova and B. G. Tartakovskiy, senior researchers at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, and T. L. Gutman, with a commentary by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Marx' comments on the views of the American vulgar bourgeois economist, Henry Charles Carey, are printed below in the Russian language for the first time. These remarks have been taken from an article by Adolf Kluss, member of the Communist Alliance, on "The 'Best Paper in the States' and Its 'Better People' and Political Economists." The article was written by Kluss on the basis of letters written to him and to Weidemeyer* by Marx in 1852 and 1853 and published in the New York workers' newspaper DIE REFORM in September 1853.

Despite their brevity, Marx' remarks are of considerable interest in many respects. Above all, this is one more piece of evidence of the way in which Marx' ideas spread through the workers' press during the first half of the 1850's. In contrast to the well-known fact that Marx and Engels had been associated with the progressive bourgeois American paper, THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE, from August 1851 until March 1862, this fact was much less known to the general public.

After the defeat of the revolution of 1848-1849 in Europe, the large group of economic emigrants from the Old World to the United States included a significant number of political emigrants, mainly German Democrats, some of whom were also proletarian revolutionaries. The influence of this element, often

* J. Weidemeyer (an artilleryman who commanded the St. Louis military district during the American Civil War) and A. Kluss (engineer and worker at the naval headquarters in Washington) worked together intensively during the 1850's for the American English- and German-language press and the workers' and democratic newspapers. A relatively large amount of literature on Weidemeyer (and some on Kluss) exists in the USSR and abroad.

on a higher level intellectually than the society of which it became a part and politically quite active, soon became apparent in various spheres of American social and political life. Many new magazines and newspapers began to be published and, although most of them were printed in German and were limited by the sectarian interests of individual groups within the petty bourgeois emigration, all of the more talented and more progressive persons involved in them were able to transcend the limited framework of emigrant life and the intraemigrant struggle and begin to solve the problems which were facing the nation that had become their second motherland.

Among these, the names of Joseph Weidemeyer and Adolf Kluss deserve mention; these members of the Communist Alliance were the first propagandists of Marxism in the United States. Joseph Weidemeyer published K. Marx' classic, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in New York in 1852 and, in conjunction with Kluss, printed several of Marx' other works in American newspapers in the German language. An important role in the propagandization of Marxism was played by one of the best American proletarian newspapers of that time, DIE REFORM, the organ of the American Workers' Alliance, which was published from 5 March 1853 until the end of April 1854. In addition to Weidemeyer, Kluss also took part in editing the paper. In the first half of the 1850's, Marx and Engels carried on a lively correspondence with Weidemeyer and Kluss, who then sent these letters on to one another. In this way, there was constant contact between them, and the founders of Marxism had the possibility of aiding their supporters in the political and ideological struggle which was taking shape in the German emigrant community in regard to important aspects of the socioeconomic and political development of the United States.

During these years, the struggle between the young and growing American bourgeoisie and English capital, which still had a monopoly on the world market, became acute. This struggle affected the outlook of the American bourgeoisie and was reflected in the works of its most prominent economist, H. C. Carey, who defended protectionist ideals and the harmony of class interests.* Carey's preachings were supported by one of the leading American newspapers, THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE, as well as by economists and journalists from the petty bourgeois and bourgeois German emigrant community, who were striving to incorporate themselves into the governmental system and the nation's economy. This group became particularly active at the time when President Franklin Pierce, candidate of the Democratic Party, came to power in the fall of 1852. These subjects were constantly discussed in the correspondence by Marx, Engels, Kluss and Weidemeyer. On the pages of DIE REFORM, Kluss opposed the NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG paper, around which the ideologists of this group--A. Hoegg, T. Poesche, C. Goepp and others--were grouped.

The immediate cause of this article by Kluss was an article by Poesche, "On Class Struggles," which was printed in NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG on 3 September 1853.

* Carey's book, "The Harmony of Interests: Manufacturing and Commercial," was published in Philadelphia in 1851, and "The Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign: Why It Exists, and How It May Be Extinguished" was published in the same city in 1853.

In this article, the author made snide references to those who supported the theory of class struggle and the representatives of proletarian socialism in an attempt to counter this with the theory of "class harmony" which was being preached by bourgeois ideologists. On the next day, 4 September, Kluss wrote to Marx of his intention to argue against the author's attempts to represent the views of the Frenchman Bastiat and the American Carey, vulgar bourgeois economists, as the latest German-American discovery and as an expression of the "highest degree of unity" in political economy. Kluss' intention met with the complete approval of Marx, who replied on 15 September 1853: "Poesche...cracks vulgar jokes, with pretensions to wit, about the comical 'cranks,' the 'class strugglers'.... It seems to me that the time has come for you to resume your polemics and expose these vulgar Goepp and Poesche, who have invented the materialistic viewpoint, in the proper way: In actuality, their materialism is the materialism of any mediocre Philistine."*

The article by Kluss, which is written in a keen polemic format and a unique style, contains many details on the intraemigrant struggle, which have lost their topical significance. But it is still interesting for its criticism of the ideological disorder within the German petty bourgeois emigration of the Old and New worlds and the views of American economists, which reflected the peculiarities of American capitalist development, and for its explanation of the position of the proletarian revolutionaries, headed by Marx.

In his work on the article, Kluss made extensive use of the letters written to him and Weidemeyer by Marx and Engels in 1852 and 1853. Although many of these letters, including those from which Kluss quoted Marx' remarks about Carey, have not been found, several existing data attest to the fact that Kluss included excerpts from letters by Marx in his article in their entirety, introducing minimal stylistic changes and additions only for the purpose of expressing the total text more coherently. This is attested to, above all, by the similarity and, sometimes, the identical nature, of these excerpts to statements about Carey in letters that Marx wrote to Engels on 14 June 1853 and to Weidemeyer on 5 March 1852.** In a letter to Engels on 8 October 1853, Marx commended this work by Kluss and frankly stated: "In his article against the NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG, he, it seems to me, was quite successful in choosing the appropriate passages from my letters about Carey and so forth."***

Naturally, it was difficult to separate the excerpts written by Marx from statements by Kluss in this article. This could only be done with a sufficient degree of reliability by means of careful comparison of these excerpts to other statements about Carey which were known to have been made by Marx; these excerpts were distinguished from the surrounding text by Kluss not only in terms of their content and theoretical level, but also in terms of their

* K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 28, p 500.

** Ibid., pp 227-228, 424.

*** Ibid., p 254.

style. The style of the author's interpolations and additions is dramatically different from the text by Marx, although in some cases Kluss restates Marx' own ideas in these passages. In the present edition, these interpolations and additions are quoted in the footnotes.

Marx' text is primarily distinguished from Kluss' own text by the fact that, in contrast to the latter, Marx was concerned with the cardinal, theoretical aspects of capitalist development in the United States, its position in the general system of capitalist relations and the related specific features in the development of American economic thought, which were most precisely reflected in the views of H. C. Carey. These were actually Marx' first statements against Carey in the press. They acquired particular value due to the fact that Marx challenged vulgar bourgeois political economy in the same nation which, with its transitory developmental features, served Carey and his followers as a basis for the theory of the "harmony of interests" and their refutation of the idea that class struggle is inevitable in the capitalist society.

The ideas contained in the remarks about Carey were later developed by Marx in his notes on "Bastiat and Carey" (July 1857),* which became part of the economic manuscript of 1857-1858 ("Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie")--the original draft of "Das Kapital." The fact that Marx later continued to criticize Carey's views and to regard them as the typical opinions of vulgar bourgeois political economy, reflected in a form characteristic of American bourgeois economic thought, is attested to by the remarks which he made about Carey in various passages of the first volume of "Das Kapital," which was published in 1867. In later works (including "Anti-Duehring"), Marx and Engels returned to this subject several times, criticizing individual premises of Carey's philosophy, particularly his theory of rents. All of these later works substantially supplemented Marx' original criticism, but his first statements against Carey in the American newspaper, DIE REFORM, have still not lost their theoretical value. They are also still valuable as an example of the analysis of the peculiarities of American economic development in the mid-19th century, the position of American capitalism in the world economy and its relations with capitalist England--the monopolist in the world market at that time. Marx' ideas about the quicker rates of development in the "young" capitalist nations (for example, the United States) than in the old ones, which had taken the capitalist course long before and were "oversaturated by capital" (Holland and England), shed light on the general laws governing the history of capitalism as a whole.

To this, we must also add that the analytical criticism of the views of Carey and his German-American followers in 1852-1853 played an important part in impelling Marx to formulate some premises, which have become classic, of his theory of socialist revolution. For example, in a letter to Weidemeyer on 5 March 1852, which was written precisely in connection with

* Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 46, pt I, pp 3-16. This excerpt was first printed in the magazine DIE NEUE ZEIT, No 27, 1903-1904.

the criticism of Carey, Marx explained the fundamentally new premises which he had introduced into the theory of class struggle.*

The title of the article has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee.

All editing work was done by senior researchers at the institute, V. A. Smirnova and B. G. Tartakovskiy, with the aid of T. L. Gutman.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee

On the Subject of Carey--by Karl Marx

In America,¹ where social conflicts are now less developed than in Europe, the foundations of which have been thoroughly undermined, this theory found a representative in the person of Carey, the economist. In the person of Professor Wayland, it also found a conservative bourgeois (from the standpoint of the newer English school) opponent. To the profound distress of Carey's followers, Wayland's "The Elements of Political Economy"² began to be used as a textbook in most of the educational institutions of New England.³

Carey should mainly be given credit for actually being able to develop a unique product, derived directly from American soil without any extraneous admixtures. His science represents nothing more or less than a universal point; it is a purely /Yankee science./ It tries to prove that the /economic/ conditions of the bourgeois society are not conditions of struggle and antagonism, but, rather, conditions of association and harmony (in theory this is quite pretty, but in practice this is represented by the modern factory town!) These economic conditions are divided into:

- 1) /Rent,/ the share of the property owner;
- 2) /Profit,/ the share of the capitalist;
- 3) /Wages,/ the share of the worker in the value of the finished product.

As we can see, Carey is too experienced to follow the example of the new Roman youths from Philadelphia⁴ or their predecessor, s. v.** Heinzen,⁵ in relating the existence of classes to the presence of /political/ privileges and monopolies and, therefore, in believing that the Great French Revolution was completely responsible for the invention of social harmony and patented it once and for all.⁶ Carey, to the contrary, looks for economic reasons for economic facts, but, naturally, does not transcend the framework of the still vague, imprecise and changing class relations in America. That is why

* Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 28, pp 424-427.

** Salva venia (Latin)--by your leave.--Ed.

he mistakes something which is only a /transient moment/ in the development of society for the /normal relations/ of its life. The Carey school's arguments with English economists are even more indicative. The Carey school attacks Ricardo, this classic representative of the bourgeoisie and stoic opponent of the proletariat, as a man whose works allegedly serve as an arsenal for anarchists and socialists or, in short, for all "enemies of the bourgeois order." With the same kind of fanaticism it displays in regard to Ricardo, the school also persecutes all other authoritative economists of modern bourgeois Europe and accuses these economic heralds of the bourgeoisie of tearing society apart and forging the weapons for civil war by cynically proving that the economic bases of various classes must give rise to inevitable and constantly growing antagonism between them.

The French Bastiat is an unconditional advocate of free trade; with naive simple-mindedness, the Roman youths from Philadelphia repeat after him, as if in prayer, the "blessing of free trade." Carey himself began his career in economics as an advocate of free trade and cracked some excellent jokes in his own time: For example, he equated bourgeois France with China because of its liking for protective tariffs.⁷ Just as all good advocates of free trade, he felt that all social disorders stemmed from excessive intervention by the state in the domain of private industry and so forth. In this, he was completely a Yankee, a Yankee from head to toe. Now Carey has turned sour; he moans and grieves along with the Frenchman Sismondi⁸ about the destructive effects of the centralization of large industry in England; which, in his opinion, is an "evil principle" in society.⁹ In addition to the fact that Carey absolutely does not see the /revolutionary,/ transforming nature of the destructive effects of industry, he is still too much a Yankee to place the /responsibility/ on industry as such, which would be the only correct conclusion to be drawn from his statements. He makes the English personally responsible for the effects of their industry, not to mention the fact that Ricardo once again turns out to be responsible for England. Having fallen into this contradiction, Carey must gradually tend more and more toward petty bourgeois [ways of thought] and toward the patriarchal alliance of landowners with manufacturers, which existed at one time but was done away with long ago.

Everything that has transpired with Carey and his followers has resulted from the fact that they are Yankees: On the pretext and--we can even suppose--with good intentions and the conviction that they are representing the "largest and longest-suffering class," they challenge the English bourgeoisie. Sismondi did this by blasting /modern industry/ and expressing nostalgia for the /manufacturing industry of the past/; they do this by praising the protective tariffs of the present day. Therefore, with their philanthropic phrases, they essentially only want to artificially /accelerate the English/ development of the /industrial bourgeoisie of America./ This was a philanthropic and utopian style of competitive struggle between England and America, the struggle which is such an interesting phenomenon to modern bourgeois political economists. The genius of political economy is manifested here in the most brilliant way.¹⁰

The fact is that, in the competitive struggle between America and England, we see how the latter is falling back more and more to the positions of Venice, Genoa and Holland, which were all forced to lend out their capital at interest after they had lost their monopoly on trade. Genoa and Venice aided in the ascent of Holland. Holland provided England with capital and now England is being forced to do the same for the United States of America. But now this reversal is so much more grandiose in every respect. The position of England is distinguished from the position of these other powers by the fact that, for the latter, the trade monopoly was a precedent which was easy to break, while England also has an industrial monopoly, which is more stable by nature. On the other hand, the English bourgeoisie is so colossally oversaturated with capital that it has been forced to construct railroads in both halves of the world and to invest its capital in the gas lighting of Berlin, vineyards in Bordeaux, Russian factories and American ships. All of this provides material for interesting observations as the gravitational force possessed by English centralized capital [Centralkapital] is inevitably supplemented by a centrifugal force which again chases it to all corners of the world. If a revolution should flare up, it would turn out that the English had created all of the means of communication and machines for production free of charge for the European continent; America is not expecting a revolution; it is carrying out its own transactions in a conservative bourgeois manner, liquidating its debt to England from time to time by means of bankruptcy. This is one of the secrets of its rapid ascent, a natural phenomenon, similar to railroad and steamship catastrophes. The same carelessness and the same tempestuous production boom which gave tens of thousands of people the opportunity to emerge onto the face of the earth, who would otherwise never have been born, are indifferently, with the aid of the steam engine, leading hundreds and hundreds of people to a premature death. One is only a supplement to the other. /Unlimited augmentation of the wealth of capitalist associations with a complete disregard for human life!/--this is the clear message of the "victory of individuality in the Anglo-Saxon milieu"!¹¹

Written by K. Marx in 1852-1853

Printed in DIE REFORM, Nos 49 and 50, 17 and 21 September 1853

Reprinted from newspaper text. First translation from German into Russian

FOOTNOTES

1. Kluss prefaced this excerpt with the following text: "The conservative bourgeois economic theory, against which /socialists (Sozialen) of all factions/ are fighting, the theory of the American Carey and the Frenchman Bastiat, is being presented to the gullible public (incidentally, judging by the prolonged cries for help from NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG and rumors, this hypothesis about the public may be premature) as the latest German-American discovery and as the /'highest synthesis'/ of political economy. We will see that whenever this high-flown highest synthesis dares to intrude into real life, it plays into the hands of /the powers

that be/ as a gun ready for the firing. It would seem that the editors of NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG have still not marred their spotless record by studying any treatises on such bothersome material as political economy, since we have daily proof that their debates on social matters are only fit for the scrap heap. The doctrine mentioned above and Monsieur Bastiat himself were conclusively condemned by the socialist tribunals of Europe in 1849 at the time of the polemics in Proudhon's VOIX DU PEUPLE; subsequent historical events deprived this theory, which reflected such a limited historical period, of any grounds in European society."

Kluss' opinions about Bastiat's polemics with petty bourgeois socialists (this refers primarily to the arguments between Bastiat and Proudhon) do not agree with the opinions of Marx; see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 16, p 30; vol 26, pt III, p 550; vol 27, p 333.

NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG (New England News) was a democratic newspaper published in German in Boston by Eduard Schleger, a petty bourgeois democrat; it was founded in 1852. A. Ruge, A. Hoegg, K. Heinzen and other German bourgeois radicals and petty bourgeois democrats worked on the paper. For some time, the newspaper also printed articles by J. Weidemeyer.

2. Wayland, Francis (1796-1865)--an American clergyman, author of popular textbooks on ethics and political economy and the president of a university in the American city of Providence; Marx is referring to the following work: F. Wayland, "The Elements of Political Economy," Boston, 1843. The first edition was published in Boston in 1837.
3. This is followed by a statement which has been inserted into Marx' text by Kluss: "We will briefly summarize the basic principles of the doctrine expounded by Bastiat in his 'Social Harmonies' artfully and in an easily comprehensible style, which were propagandized by Carey without any kind of talent for exposition and without any gift for generalization or precision. It cannot be denied that H. C. Carey had a certain amount of positive knowledge and even some fine original ideas." For Marx' comparison of Carey and Bastiat, see Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 46, pt I, pp 4, 5, 9, 196.
4. This is a play on words in reference to the title of a book by the German petty bourgeois democrats T. Poesche and C. Goepp: "The New Rome. The United States of the World," published in Philadelphia in 1853.
5. Heinzen, Karl (1809-1880)--German journalist of radical leanings and petty bourgeois democrat who opposed Marx and Engels.
6. The intervention of Kluss is perceptible in this statement, which is also attested to by his letter to Marx of 11 September 1853. In a letter from Marx to Weidemeyer on 5 March 1852, from which Kluss adopted this idea, Marx said: Carey "tries to refute them [the economists of

Europe--Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, Say and others--Ed.], but not in the manner of stupid Heinzen, who relates the existence of classes to the presence of /political/ privileges and /monopolies./ Carey wishes to show that /economic/ conditions--rent (property), /profit/ (capital) and wages (hired labor)--represent the conditions for association and harmony and not the conditions for struggle and antagonism." (Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 28, p 424).

7. Reference here is made to Carey's book, "Essay on the Rate of Wages: With an Examination of the Causes of Differences in the Condition of the Labouring Population Throughout the World," Philadelphia-London, 1835, pp 194-210, 213-220, 228, 230 and others.
8. Sismondi (de Sismondi), Jean Charles Leonard Simonde (1773-1842)--a Swiss economist, petty bourgeois critic of capitalism and prominent representative of economic romanticism.
9. Marx is writing here about Carey's book, "The Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign: Why It Exists, and How It May Be Extinguished," Philadelphia, 1853.

In this book, Carey cites (pp 202-203) Marx' article, "Choices; Financial Complications; The Duchess of Sutherland and Slavery," which was published in THE NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE on 9 February 1853 (Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 8, pp 521-528). Marx became acquainted with this book when a copy was sent to him by the author, and on 14 June 1853 he wrote a letter to Engels, containing a brief critical review of this book, the basic points of which are repeated in this excerpt (see Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 28, pp 227-228). The almost completely identical text of the comments by Marx printed in DIE REFORM and in his letter to Engels again testifies that far from all of the correspondence of Marx and Engels with their associates in the United States is extant and that the contents of the letter from Marx to Engels mentioned above were repeated in one of the missing letters.

A statement which follows was inserted into Marx' text by Kluss: "How greatly amazed he would be if he knew that these silly German boys were interpreting the avalanchelike increase in the strength of large capital as a form of the snowball of the 'Anglo-Saxon' spirit of decentralization and individuality."

10. A statement by Kluss follows: "Since this was completely unnoticed even by Carey's school, it would naturally be completely wrong for us to demand that the sadly mistaken statesmen and newly fledged government economists from NEU-ENGLAND-ZEITUNG would gain at least a general understanding of the fact that they are sitting in bourgeois manure up to their ears and are still quite far from an understanding of the historic significance of the trend which they themselves have learned by heart."

11. This is followed by statements which were written by Kluss and which conclude the criticism of Carey and his followers in this article: "All of these facts, naturally, are inaccessible to the 'sober fear of the stick and primitive intelligence' of the Roman youths from Philadelphia, who gleaned wisdom from some conservative magazine that told them that working women in Lowell supposedly earn three times as much today as they did 30 years ago. Judging by this wise conclusion, the working women of that time must have only eaten four and a half days out of the week and covered their nakedness with a fig leaf at best. The fact that the city only took shape in general within the last 30 years and grew from a small town of 200 individuals, who lived a vegetative and uneventful existence, into a factory city with 36,000 inhabitants; the fact that today approximately one-third of this population consists of working women (women make up five-eighths of the Lowell population and men only account for three-eighths, but we feel that this incongruity is actually even more dramatic), who are barely able to make ends meet with their average weekly wage of 3 dollars, that is, their wages fluctuate around this average in such a way that they might deposit a penny into their savings accounts in good times and spend it when business dies down or when their work day is cut in half; and the fact that most of these working women are doomed to spinsterhood by circumstances rather than by democratic statutes are all facts which the 'democratic' candidate for a position is not allowed to see, even if we assume that he would be capable of seeing this.

"Naturally, here in America, we cannot deny the 'equal opportunities for individuals, beyond which some people (that is, the Philadelphia Romans) are incapable of seeing anything'; gold fever has served for a long time as a Roman-democratic commissioner, and the equality of opportunities has been demonstrated in New Orleans. But the possibility of equality, my good man, is on the other side of the bourgeois horizon and can only be perceived by the more broad outlook, unfettered by any kind of prejudice, of that reformer [K. Marx--Ed.] who knows everything about the modern labor question in its entirety."

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SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL FIRST RESULTS

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[Text] The USSR and the United States--scientifically and technically the most advanced nations in the world--only recently began to organize long-range, broad-scale scientific and technical cooperation, which is now becoming not only a precondition, but also a condition for the resolution of several complex problems facing mankind during the last quarter of the 20th century.

It has been around 5 years since the first agreement in the history of Soviet-American relations was signed by representatives of the Soviet and American governments on cooperation in science and technology during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972. This agreement was followed by intergovernmental agreements on several important areas of scientific and technical progress. In all, ten specialized agreements were signed during the 1972-1974 summit meetings: On environmental protection, on space research and the use of space for peaceful purposes, on medical science and public health care, on agriculture, on world ocean research, on transportation, on the peaceful use of atomic energy, on power engineering, on residential construction and other types of construction and on the study and development of an artificial heart.

A period of just a few years is too short a period to use as a basis for making final judgments, but a great deal has been done in the development of scientific and technical relations and this permits us to summarize the first results of this work and to assess the degree to which planned programs are being implemented successfully.

The Foundation Is Laid

As a rule, international scientific and technical cooperation goes through four stages: the familiarization of the partners with one another's scientific and technical achievements, the exchange of achievements, joint

research and development, and the utilization of the results of these joint research and development programs by both partners.

When such scientifically and technically powerful nations as the USSR and United States begin the process of broad-scale and long-range cooperation, perceptible results can be achieved during each of these stages. When a transition is made to more improved forms of cooperation, the results of the cooperation increase. The rate of progress from one stage to another depends on many factors, including the interest of the parties, mutual trust and a favorable political, economic and legal "environment." Naturally, cooperation can only be full-fledged and mutually advantageous and can only reach the highest stages of development in those cases when each of the parties involved has original scientific and technical discoveries and experience. The mutual advantage of stable long-term interaction by the parties does not depend on temporary factors, but on the size and nature of the scientific and technical potential of the partners, the contribution of each partner to the development of world science and technology and the objective need for united action in the most important areas. It is precisely these factors which indicate a promising future for the development of this kind of cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

The organization of scientific and technical relations between countries that are distinguished by such great social, political and economic differences and, moreover, between countries that have had a minimum of business contacts during the quarter-century of cold war is a difficult task which requires patience, good will and tenacity. It is necessary to solve many economic, financial and legal problems and, sometimes, to overcome substantial psychological barriers and firmly entrenched ideas and habits. This is not a task that can be carried out immediately.

By concluding the agreements on scientific and technical cooperation listed above, the governments of the USSR and the United States laid a solid legal basis for the organization of joint action. In addition to this, in order to simplify scientific contacts and the exchange of experience, the two governments concluded a long-term agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial and technical cooperation on 29 June 1974, a general agreement on contacts, exchange and cooperation on 19 June 1973 and a convention on tariffs which was signed on 20 June 1973 and ratified by the legislative organs of both countries in December 1975.

As long as international scientific and technical interaction remains within the bounds of the first two stages--mutual familiarization with achievements and the exchange of achievements, legal, organizational and financial matters do not present any particular difficulty. But the situation changes when cooperation enters the stage of joint research and development.

What rights will American developers have to Soviet inventions, technical documents and advanced experience involved in joint research? On what terms will Soviet specialists be able to make use of the patents, "know-how" and

copyrights belonging to their American partners prior to the beginning of joint research? How will the Soviet and American partners make use of the scientific and technical discoveries made as a result of joint programs? How will the expenses and benefits of joint activity be divided? In order to lay a firm basis for mutual trust and good will from the very beginning, precise, unequivocal and mutually acceptable answers must be found for these questions.

A special operational group on intellectual property was set up as part of the joint Soviet-American commission on scientific and technical cooperation to work on these problems. Agreements have already been reached on several matters connected with the mutual transfer of rights to patents and copyrights for the purpose of joint research; the principles of patenting and using joint inventions, including their patenting and use by third parties, has been worked out; instructions have been formulated to regulate the use of scientific and technical information protected by copyrights in joint studies. In this way, a foundation has been laid for action in these areas of Soviet-American cooperation, in which the parties have reached the stage of joint research and development and in which the attainment of results of commercial value is most probable.

Operational Interaction

The list of Soviet-American intergovernmental agreements above shows that they cover the most important areas of scientific and technical progress. At present, nine joint Soviet-American commissions are engaged in carrying out these agreements; these commissions include around 100 operational groups which are conducting joint research on approximately 150 projects. What can we say today about the effects of this unification of the efforts of scientists in both countries?

The implementation of the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation of 24 May 1972 required the creation of 11 operational groups and one expert group in the following areas: the use of computers in management, chemical catalysis, water resources, microbiological synthesis, forestry, electro-metallurgy, metrology, standardization, intellectual property, scientific policy, scientific and technical information and theoretical physics.

By the time of the third session of the joint Soviet-American commission on scientific and technical cooperation (October 1974), 6 of the 49 joint projects had already reached the stage of joint operations; 4 of them involved the area of chemical catalysis and 2 concerned the use of computers in management. Within 1 year, by October 1975, at the time of the next session of the commission, the number of successfully implemented joint projects had quadrupled and had reached 24. By the beginning of 1977, most of the projects had reached the stage of joint operations and practical results had already been attained in several areas.

One of the most promising areas of cooperation concerns the use of electronic computers in management. Although some areas of capitalist management are fundamentally inapplicable and unacceptable to our society, most of the technical and organizational experience accumulated in the United States deserves careful study and interpretation. In this field, cooperative work is being done on such subjects as econometric modeling, the application of machine analysis to the control of large systems, the use of electronic computers in urban management, the theoretical basis of mathematical data for the use of computers in economic and production management and the use of computers in the advanced training of administrative personnel of the highest rank.

In accordance with the first project, models for the development of various branches of the economy are being worked out. Despite the fact that the system of national economic planning in the USSR differs radically from the practice of state-monopolistic economic regulation in the United States, both countries are interested in the analysis of current economic indicators and the subsequent use of these indicators for long-range branch forecasting.

Modeling the development of branches permits the assessment of the consequences of certain changes in production conditions, which can aid in improving our planning methods. In turn, a study of the methods of state planning in the USSR, particularly in such fields as power engineering and transportation, is of great interest to American specialists.

Cooperation in another field--the application of machine analysis to the control of large systems--is of great practical significance. A vast amount of work is being done in this area in both countries and this is making it possible for them to unite their efforts in the development of larger and more efficient systems of data processing and control. A broad program has been instituted for the exchange of literature and information on studies and their results and the exchange of specialists, including long-term visits. Seminars are held on specific problems. For example, in October 1976, a seminar was held on the use of electronic computers in the planning and management of large agroindustrial complexes.

As we have already mentioned, chemical catalysis was one of the areas in which Soviet-American scientific and technical cooperation reached the stage of joint research earlier. During 1973-1976, 16 Soviet specialists were involved in research programs in the United States for 6 months each; 23 Americans worked in the USSR for 3-6 months each. During the course of joint operations, catalysts developed by scientists from both countries were tested and the results of the experiments were summarized in 20 joint articles, which were published in Soviet and American magazines. These joint studies are expected to result in the development of more effective catalysts and catalytic systems and in improved methods for clearing the air of nitric oxide.

In some cases, the scientific discoveries of one country have supplemented the discoveries of the other in the same specific areas of joint operations, which has saved the partners a great deal of time, effort and resources. In presenting his general opinion of this cooperation during congressional hearings in the fall of 1975 in the United States, Dr G. Boldschweiler (California Institute of Technology), co-chairman of the Soviet-American operational group on chemical catalysis, said: "Our progress has gone far beyond my initial expectations.... We have been able to carry out fundamental studies, the results of which have already been published and will continue to be published in the general press. I feel that this work has been of excellent quality...."¹

Another one of the promising areas of cooperation for the attainment of mutually beneficial results is electrometallurgy. Specialists from both countries are working together on a process for covering the working surface of metal-cutting tools, mining equipment and other machines with a hard metal condensate by means of cathode rays. This kind of coating will make it possible to extend the service life of existing equipment by 1-2 percent or more. If the service life is extended in this way throughout industry, both nations will save hundreds of millions of rubles and dollars each year. It is also possible that promising inventions that will be patented jointly might be developed in the area of electrometallurgy.

Studies in the area of metrology are also being carried out successfully, such as studies involving the comparison of pressure unit standards, voltage standards, the length of laser beams and thermocouple standards.

A great deal of work has been done to carry out the specialized intergovernmental agreements, particularly the agreement on cooperation in the area of environmental protection, which was signed on 23 May 1972. This agreement has served as the basis for 39 Soviet-American projects; during 1975 alone, around 100 joint measures were instituted.

The most important problem listed in this agreement concerns the prevention of atmospheric pollution. The "Clean Air-76" seminar held in Moscow in February 1976 and attended by Soviet and American specialists, which was described in detail in this magazine,² provides a good indication of the work that has been done in this area.

Water conservation is also one of the acute problems with a significance which far transcends the boundaries of national interests. Soviet and American specialists were able to organize joint work in this area as well.

1. "U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis of the Committee on Science and Technology. U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 18-20 November 1975, Wash., 1976, p 216.

2. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1976, pp 115-126.

The results of the first stage in the cooperation to keep rivers, lakes and seas clean were summarized at a symposium in Khar'kov in December 1975. Around 100 specialists from scientific research institutions in the USSR and the United States discussed their experience in the development of automated systems for controlling water conservation complexes, working out mathematical programs for electronic computers and collecting the data needed for the prevention of water pollution. A Soviet-American symposium on the use of mathematical models to control the quality of water was held in Rostov-on-Don. Those who attended this symposium approved a joint plan for cooperation in the area of water conservation during the next 5 years.

Specialists from both nations learned about technical water conservation means in ports and on vessels and about the methods used to prevent the pollution of water by fishing boats. Joint work is being done to develop technical requirements, standards and recommendations within the framework of the program of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. In addition to this, the specialists are working on rescue expeditions to deal with oil spills in the open sea and on the development of equipment for the efficient collection and containment of oil.

Soviet and American scientists have decided to open another fundamentally new area of cooperation--the creation of the first biospheric preserves on earth. Any form of human activity--agricultural cultivation of the land, the construction of cities and settlements, the laying of transportation and energy channels, etc.--has an effect on the environment. In order to establish scientifically substantiated norms for human activity so that nature will not be irrevocably harmed, a system must be developed for measuring all effects on the environment in terms of qualitative and quantitative indices. The development of these indices will require the creation of reference zones--"quiet zones"--which will be carefully protected. In order to escape the effects of incidental factors, Soviet and American scientists will begin to work on the creation of such "quiet zones" in similar regions of both nations.

In April 1976, a Soviet-American symposium was held in Dushanbe to discuss the genetic consequences of environmental pollution on the living organism. Scientists from both countries took important steps in the development of an approach to the resolution of several problems; in particular, various kinds of test systems were worked out to determine the effect of atmospheric pollutants which can be used in practice.

Earthquake prediction is another important area of cooperation in which many countries are interested. The prediction of severe earthquakes can be based on the statistical processing of large amounts of data on small shifts in the earth's crust. Highly sensitive measurement equipment has been developed in the United States to record such movements. Soviet specialists have worked out improved methods for the mathematical processing of data and the acquisition of the data needed for predictions. Three earthquakes were predicted in the United States in 1974 with the aid of these methods.

Instruments for recording movements in the earth's crust are being tested in regions with constant seismic activity in the USSR. One of these regions is the Garmsko-Dushanbe testing ground in the Tadzhik SSR. Joint studies are being made on seismic activity in connection with the filling of a water reservoir in the region of the Nurekskaya Hydroelectric Station. The research being conducted in regions of man-made water reservoirs is not only of exceptional importance to the USSR and the United States, but also to other nations: It was precisely because of the seismic fluctuations resulting from the rapid filling of water reservoirs that dams were damaged in India (Coimbatore), Greece (Kremasti) and the south of Africa (Kariba).

Soviet and American scientists are also working together to study tidal waves. During August-September 1975, a group of American scientists took part in a joint expedition on the Valerian Uryvayev research vessel to study fluctuations in the sea level of the southern part of the Kuril Channel. The notations of seabed registers which recorded the level of the ocean were then processed by Soviet and American scientists in one of the institutes of the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This joint work represents an important step toward the establishment of close interaction between tidal wave warning systems on the Pacific coasts of the USSR and United States.

Environmental protection takes in an enormous group of problems of a fundamental, theoretical and strictly practical nature. For example, the exchange of experience in the extinguishing of forest fires in the fall of 1976 was of great practical value. A delegation of American specialists came to the Soviet Union to demonstrate their fire-fighting methods to Soviet aviators and fire-fighting parachutists in simulated conditions in the Karelian ASSR. This is also one of the links of Soviet-American interaction on the operational level.

In this article, we will not discuss Soviet-American cooperation in space research and the peaceful use of outer space, since the magazine recently published an article describing the results and prospects of work in this area.³ We will only say that the main event at the 27th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, which was held in October 1976, was a report by Soviet and American scientists on the results of their joint Apollo-Soyuz program, which again stressed the enormous practical value of cooperation in space exploration.

Since 1972, Soviet-American cooperation in the fields of medicine and public health care has been developing successfully. The exchange of information, medicines and technology has already led to substantial results--in particular, the publication of 80 joint scientific reports and other materials. At present, the USSR and the United States have approximately 100 specialists each working in one another's countries in the area of medicine, who are concentrating their efforts in the most important fields (cardiovascular and cancer research, the diagnosis and treatment of arthritis and pneumonia, etc.)

3. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1976, pp 36-44

Heart disease is the major field in which the Soviet and American scientists are cooperating in the area of public health, and the first results have already been obtained. A program is being carried out to study the causes of atherosclerosis, in accordance with which around 22,000 American males between the ages of 40 and 60 are being examined in ten zones and cities of the nation. In the USSR, a similar study is being made of 10,000 persons in Moscow and Leningrad. The methods for selecting a sample group and the examination procedures have been standardized and the results are being processed by electronic computer according to a common program. By the spring of 1976, the scientists were able to obtain important data which will aid in determining the interconnection between accumulation of lipid-containing material within the blood and atherosclerosis.

Work is being done to compare the results of various methods for treating ischemic heart disease. In the United States, the preferred method is surgery, while the USSR relies more on drug therapy. The observance of identical groups of patients for a period of 5 years will make treatment more effective in both countries.

Several joint symposiums have been held to discuss the prevention of myocarditis and the treatment of congenital heart defects. There has been an exchange of information and scientific delegations on the problem of sudden death and the prevention of the negative side-effects of the treatment of cardiovascular disease, particularly the consequences of cardiac surgery.

Another area of cooperation in the fight against cardiovascular disease--the study and development of an artificial heart--became the subject of a separate intergovernmental agreement, which was signed on 28 June 1974.⁴

In the field of oncology--the second most important area of Soviet-American cooperation in medicine--joint research is being conducted on the medical treatment (chemotherapy) of tumors. The exchange and mutual testing of around 150 chemical preparations have been organized and the possibilities for using several American preparations in the USSR and Soviet preparations in the United States are being studied. American scientists have pointed out the effectiveness of Soviet preparations for the treatment of breast cancer, while Soviets have recognized the beneficial effects of the American preparation used to treat tumors in the lymphatic system. A joint monograph on "The Development of Preparations for the Treatment of Cancer" has been edited. At a conference of oncologists from both nations in Leningrad in April 1976, Soviet and American medics signed a protocol on cooperation in the development of new means and methods of oncological chemotherapy.

The last few years, in the opinion of the most authoritative specialists, have clearly attested to the fact that Soviet-American cooperation can become an important factor in the acceleration of the progress of modern medical biological science in the interests of better health for people throughout the world.

4. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1976, pp 105-114.

The agreement on cooperation in agriculture of 19 June 1973 envisaged certain new forms of cooperation in addition to existing ones as, for example, the exchange of scientists and specialists and the exchange of vegetation, seeding material and organic material; these new forms, which will be fundamentally developed, would include the exchange of scientific, technical, economic and procedural information on scientific studies; the planning, development and implementation of joint projects and programs; the exchange of animals, biological material, agricultural chemical fertilizers and models of new machines, equipment and scientific instruments; and direct contacts between botanical gardens.

In 1974, cooperation was begun on 20 projects which encompassed a broad range of important problems connected with the cultivation of plants, animal husbandry, soil management, the mechanization of agriculture, the integration of branches of the agroindustrial complex and the prediction of the demand for agricultural goods and the production of these goods. Since 1975, scientists and specialists have participated directly in the performance of joint tasks, the coordination and development of procedures, the performance of preparatory work for experiments and the conducting of these experiments, and the testing of machines, equipment and strains of various crops.

Within the framework of the agreement on cooperation in research on the world ocean of 19 June 1973, the program of Soviet-American oceanographic study, which began in the 1960's, is being continued. We should cite at least two recent projects as an example of this work. One of them has involved the development of the fairly long tradition of participation by Soviet scientists in experiments on the American Glomar Challenger scientific research vessel. During the course of this project, thousands of types of seabed samples were obtained from a depth of up to 6,000 meters, and drilling disclosed a second seismic stratum--an area of dramatic change in the characteristics of the earth's crust.

Another joint Soviet-American program--"Polymode"--has been devoted to the study of oceanic whirlwinds, powerful whirlpool formations which are similar to atmospheric cyclones, the cause of which is still unknown. Fundamental research within the context of this program is planned for 1977-1978 and will involve the participation of scientists from England, Canada, France and the FRG as well. The first large-scale expedition of the Polymode program was organized in 1976 on the Soviet Akademik Vernadskiy scientific research vessel, which successfully carried out a series of studies in the region of the Bermuda Triangle. American man-made satellites were used to measure the oceanic whirlpools and provided for constant supervision of the position of experimental buoys in the ocean. Soviet and American scientists expect their united effort to provide them with a more profound understanding of oceanic processes and the means for long-range prediction of oceanic whirlwinds.

The agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation of 19 June 1973 initially envisaged cooperative work in five areas: maritime, air and railway transport, the construction of bridges and tunnels and automobile traffic

safety. In 1974, a decision was made to broaden the sphere of cooperation and to include three new areas: the transportation of the future, municipal transport and the improvement of commercial transport documents.

One of the most important results of Soviet-American cooperation in the area of transportation in 1975 consisted in the transition from the exchange of information to joint research and development in various projects. For example, the operational group for the improvement of transport documents began to conduct joint experiments, as a result of which the transmission of such documents between the ports of Leningrad and Baltimore should be accelerated.

Work was also begun on joint research to increase the speed of trains on ordinary railways to 200 kilometers per hour and to study the possibilities for the development of fundamentally new types of trains with a speed of around 500 kilometers per hour. The "transportation of the future" is very much a present-day problem for designers and planners in both countries and, for this reason, both sides are interested in optimizing exploratory and experimental work in this field.

The agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy of 21 June 1973 was concluded for a 10-year period and envisages cooperative efforts in three areas: controlled thermonuclear synthesis, fast breeder reactors and the study of the fundamental properties of matter.⁵ The Soviet Union was the first to develop the Tokamak experimental thermonuclear unit, and its program of research in this area exceeds the American program several times over. Around 65 percent of American budget appropriations for thermonuclear synthesis are now allocated for the development of units similar to the Tokamak.⁶ At the same time, American scientists have greater opportunities for carrying out computation, planning design and experimental work, including work done with the aid of high-speed computers.

The period for the exchange of information and familiarization with existing units came to an end in 1975, when the Soviet and American scientists began to carry out a joint program, working in one another's countries on joint projects.

By the beginning of 1976, around ten joint experiments had been carried out by Soviet and American physicists on the most powerful accelerator in the world at the Fermi Laboratory in Batavia (Illinois) with the use of a gas-jet reactor, which was developed by researchers at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. Recent joint experiments, just as all of the experience which has been accumulated in cooperative action in this most

5. This agreement and the initial stage in its implementation were discussed in detail in the magazine (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1974, pp 3-13).

6. "U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology," p 469.

complex branch of science, have confirmed that the unification of knowledge, experience and, finally, the experimental facilities of the two powerful scientific communities--Soviet and American--can be of great importance in the resolution of the problem of energy resources--one of the key problems concerning the future of all mankind.

Cooperative action by the USSR and the United States in the field of power engineering, which was begun within the framework of the agreement on cooperation in science and technology of 24 May 1972 and intensified in accordance with the agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy of 21 June 1973, was developed even further as a result of the conclusion of the special agreement on cooperation in power engineering on 28 June 1974. This agreement envisages the development of joint action on a broad group of fuel and energy problems, from problems connected with the extraction and refining of oil, shale, coal and natural gas to the problems involved in the technology for developing new sources of energy, such as solar and geothermal energy and artificial fuel.

Even this brief survey attests to the fact that the intergovernmental agreements on scientific and technical cooperation are being carried out at fairly rapid rates. Projects in which both countries are interested and in which their national programs supplement one another are progressing particularly successfully. In those cases when there have been disagreements about research priorities, the Soviet and American scientists have always found mutually acceptable ways of balancing expenditures and benefits, not on the basis of individual projects but in accordance with general agreements. Many organizational and financial problems have been solved. Large groups of scientists, large research centers and industrial enterprises have been involved in the joint activity.

Cooperation With Firms

One of the specific features of the organization of American scientific and technical potential consists in the fact that there is a fairly clear distinction between the functions of the state and the private sector in the activity involved in new developments. Most of the fundamental research and part of the applied research directed toward scientific discoveries and technical designs are conducted in the laboratories of government organizations and universities. Most of the experimental design work, including experimental production, and part of the applied research takes place in the private sector. This feature has also been reflected in the development of Soviet-American scientific and technical relations. Fundamental and applied studies with the possible involvement of experiments and testing have occupied the most important place in cooperation in accordance with the intergovernmental agreements. In scientific and technical cooperation with firms, the major role is played by the industrial use of innovations: The exchange of scientific and technical knowledge, joint research and development, experimentation and testing carried out within this framework are directed precisely at the use of innovations in the production sphere.

During 1972-1976, 58 agreements on scientific and technical cooperation were concluded by the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology and American firms; these agreements covered virtually all of the leading branches of modern industry. In this way, scientific and technical relations have assumed a structure which is characterized by parallel channels of interaction on various levels--both on the governmental level and on the level of immediate execution. This not only guarantees the reliability and stability of relations, but also provides for the mutual organization of perfected systems for controlling scientific and technical progress and foreign economic relations in the USSR and the United States.

Most of the agreements on scientific and technical cooperation with American firms are being carried out successfully. These include the productive and mutually beneficial cooperation with General Electric in the electronics industry and the medical equipment field; cooperation with the FMC Corporation in the organization of agroindustrial complexes for the cultivation and processing of vegetables; cooperation with the Robertson company in the field of construction materials and designs and the production of paints and varnishes; cooperation with Phillip Morris on the growing of tobacco and the production of cigarettes; cooperation with American Home Products and Bristol Myers in the manufacture of medical preparations; cooperation with Allis-Chalmers and Union Carbide in the field of ferrous metallurgy and others.

For example, work is being done with the Allis-Chalmers Corporation to improve the technology for deriving iron by means of direct reduction in place of the traditional blast furnace method. Soviet and American specialists are studying three types of installations in the firm's experimental center at Niagara Falls and in the USSR in Krivoy Rog.

The experiments which are being conducted according to coordinated programs will make it possible for Soviet and American engineers to determine the best technical designs and establish efficient industrial units.

Soviet engineers and American specialists are working on fundamentally new designs, instruments and processes, which require considerable concentration of material resources and, consequently, is much easier to accomplish through joint efforts. Another promising form of cooperation involves the joint development and mastery of the industrial production of new types of commodities on the basis of Soviet fundamental research or engineering during the stage of laboratory tests. The possibilities of this form of cooperation are now being explored with several American firms.

The organization of seminars on scientific and technical problems of topical interest is becoming a productive way of sharing scientific knowledge. The committee for science and technology of the American-Soviet commercial and economic council alone was responsible for the organization of 90 joint seminars and technical symposiums during 1975-1976. For example, the seminar on gasification and coal compression in 1976 was quite representative; it was attended by representatives of several American firms and Soviet organizations. In summing up the results of the seminar, these representatives

not only mentioned the high scientific level of the discussion and the comprehensive nature of the approach taken to the topics of discussion, but also stressed the fact that the seminar had obviously laid a foundation for promising scientific and technical cooperation in the future and had revealed the optimal guidelines for its development.

When agreements on scientific and technical cooperation with firms are being implemented, great opportunities are disclosed for the conclusion of commercial contracts; several such contracts are already being acted upon.

The commercial ties which arise from scientific and technical cooperation also take the form of long-term agreements on a compensatory basis. One example of this kind of agreement may be seen in the development of relations with the Phillip Morris firm. This interaction began with joint experiments in the growing of tobacco and the production of tobacco goods. In 1976, an agreement was concluded on the delivery of tobacco to the firm as payment for the machines and equipment purchased from the firm for the cultivation of this crop. The firm is using the Soviet tobacco to manufacture its new Apollo-Soyuz brand, and the machines purchased from Phillip Morris will be used in the future to process American strains of tobacco which have been cultivated on experimental plantations in Moldavia since 1975.

Scientific and technical cooperation is also resulting in fairly substantial purchases of Soviet scientific achievements by American firms. In 1974, a license agreement was signed with the Kaiser Corporation on the use of the Soviet method of hydraulic coal mining. Soviet specialists are working on a plan for the hydraulic mining of one of the mines of Kaiser Resources in Canada. The equipment for this will also be purchased from the USSR. Scientific and technical cooperation with the Bristol Myers firm resulted in the purchase of the Soviet fluorofur preparation for the treatment of cancer by this firm and the sale of this preparation in the United States, Canada and England.

Approximately half of the existing license agreements with American firms envisage the sale of Soviet technology to the United States, while the second half provides for the purchase of American scientific and technical achievements by the Soviet Union. This balance in the exchange of licenses again indicates the fairly proportional "technological flows" to both sides.

Prospects

It has been almost 5 years since the first agreements on scientific and technical cooperation were signed; during this time, definite success has been achieved. Organizational problems have been solved, the areas of cooperation and its basic guidelines have been determined, programs of joint operations have been compiled and are successfully being carried out, and the first tangible results have been obtained, including commercial results.

At the same time, many developed forms of cooperation, for example, those which have already been tested in the relations between the USSR and the Western European countries, are still not a part of the Soviet-American scientific and technical ties. And this is understandable, since the United States began to expand its scientific and technical contacts with the Soviet Union later than the other Western countries, and this is a process which requires time and effort. The present level of cooperation represents only the first steps toward the establishment of large-scale and long-term scientific and technical ties which will completely correspond to the potential of both nations.

The progress in the development of interrelations between the USSR and the United States during 1972-1976 provided grounds for the statement made in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress that most of the Soviet-American agreements on the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the most varied branches of economics, science, technology and culture, which were signed during the first half of the 1970's, had already been put into effect and were being "implemented to the obvious advantage of both sides and, the main thing, for the promotion of mutual understanding between the Soviet and American people."⁷

Some extremely influential groups in the United States, however, are in a situation in which their livelihood is directly connected with the continuation of the arms race and the preservation of international tension and are doing everything possible to prevent the further normalization of Soviet-American relations and to torpedo the important agreements concluded by our nations. This completely applies to such aspects of bilateral relations as scientific and technical cooperation as well. Rumors are being spread to suggest that the Soviet Union is profiting more from this cooperation than the United States and that the USSR allegedly intends to avail itself of all of the advanced American technology without reciprocating in any way.

Another typical trick used by those who oppose the normalization of relations involves the demand that scientific and technical cooperation be made conditional on certain political concessions on the part of the Soviet Union. Here the typical American habit of relying on the exertion of pressure is particularly apparent--there is no other way of describing the disruption of the normal operations of the joint Soviet-American commissions carrying out intergovernmental agreements on power engineering, residential construction and trade in the spring of 1976.

But many clearheaded American specialists feel that this approach is an incorrect one. John Kaiser, the author of an article with an extremely eloquent title, "Technology Is Not a One-Way Street," which was printed in FOREIGN POLICY, frankly states that the Americans tend to overestimate the need for American technology in foreign countries and, correspondingly, to overestimate the possibilities for using technology as a "trump card" in political bargaining. Warning against a nearsighted adherence to obsolete

7. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 20.

stereotypes, Kaiser speaks of the growing role of the Soviet Union as a source of "technological innovation" and reminds his readers that, within just 8 years--from 1966 through 1974--the number of Soviet inventions patented in the United States increased by almost 700 percent.⁸

It is extremely indicative that most of those who have already had some experience in direct commercial interaction with the Soviet Union--both businessmen and members of government circles--take a positive view of the first results of scientific and technical cooperation and its prospects. This is clearly attested to by such representative forums as the symposium on the exchange of technology between East and West, which was organized by the U.S. State Department and Department of Commerce in November 1975, and the hearings on East-West trade during 1976-1980 before the Senate Committee on Commerce in December 1975.

As we know, the fourth meeting of the American-Soviet commercial and economic council was held in Moscow from 30 November through 1 December 1976 to discuss the commercial ties between these nations and the prospects for their further development. A total of 340 individuals representing more than 100 companies in various branches of American industry came to Moscow to attend the session. In a speech at a luncheon which was held in connection with the session of the council, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev reminded his audience that several important inter-governmental agreements on the development of commercial, economic, scientific and technical cooperation had been concluded in recent years by the USSR and the United States and stressed the fact that, "in general, a fairly good organizational foundation has been established, on the basis of which various types of mutually beneficial ties between our nations have begun to multiply." In regard to prospects for the future, L. I. Brezhnev went on to say: "We would be prepared to develop our economic, technical and industrial cooperation with you, including compensatory agreements, in many branches of industry.... We are willing to continue to develop economic ties in various fields and to trade with large and medium-sized firms, but only on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage."⁹

A resolution adopted by those who attended the session states that "commercial and economic ties are beneficial to both nations and serve as an important element contributing toward the strengthening of our bilateral relations" and makes special mention of such principles as the mutual granting of most favored nation terms and credit on normal terms.

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8. FOREIGN POLICY, No 23, Summer 1976, p 136.

9. PRAVDA, 1 December 1976

PROBLEM OF THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AMERICAN APPROACHES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 23-33 LD

[Article by V. F. Davydov]

[Text] The topicality of the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is indisputable. It arises out of the urgency of the struggle against the threat of nuclear war. As L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated in the report to the 25th party congress, "...The adoption of further effective steps toward the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on our planet remains one of the most important tasks. The USSR is ready to cooperate with other states in resolving it."¹

Processes which substantially complicate and at the same time impart even greater urgency to this problem have undergone further development in the seventies. Its topicality is increasing primarily because the number of countries materially capable of creating their own nuclear weapons is increasing in step with the development of the scientific and technical revolution and the expansion of interstate cooperation, including the field of nuclear technology. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates there were 20 such "subnuclear" states in 1975 and that their numbers could rise to 30 by 1980.

The world demand for energy resources has contributed to a rapid increase in the number of nuclear reactors in the developed and developing countries, and, as is known, one of their by-products--plutonium--can be used to make an atom bomb. Western experts estimate that by 1990 in the developing countries alone enough plutonium will have been obtained to manufacture 3,000 atom bombs equal in size to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima every year.²

In other words, the probability of an increase in the "nuclear club" could turn from a hypothesis into a reality in the very near future.

In this situation there has been a sharp increase in the international significance of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which was concluded 1 July 1968 and came into force 5 March 1970. To date it encompasses approximately 100 states, a number of which have a relatively highly developed nuclear industry--Canada, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Japan. At the same time, two nuclear powers--France and the PRC--have not acceded to the treaty. A group of so-called threshold countries, which have almost reached the stage of practically implementing the idea of creating nuclear weapons of their own, including South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, and a number of others, is not covered by the treaty either. And Turkey and Egypt have to date not ratified the treaty although they have signed it.

Some Western experts do not rule out the possibility that individual countries which are party to the treaty, "discouraged" by the fact that the treaty has not yet become really universal, might embark on the path of nuclear armament and withdraw from the ranks of the parties to the treaty. This would undoubtedly cause serious complications and considerably undermine the foundations of international security as a whole.

The recently completed 31st UN General Assembly session devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of nonproliferation. The Soviet Union initiated the debate. The memorandum on questions relating to ending the arms race and to disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation notes: "It is perfectly obvious that the threat of nuclear war would grow immeasurably if other states which do not possess nuclear weapons at the present time were to become involved in the process of creating and stockpiling them. It is not difficult to imagine the possible outcome of a development of events in which nuclear weapons formed part of the arsenals of the warring sides in any given region." ³

In the contemporary world, where the relaxation of international tension is becoming increasingly tangible and people everywhere have mounting hopes of lasting peace being established, conditions are more favorable than ever before for an optimum solution to the problem of nonproliferation. The realization of these favorable opportunities and the effective blocking of existing and possible future channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons largely depends on the positions of the Western powers, primarily the United States, and on how realistically they approach questions related to these weapons.

Together with the USSR and Britain, the United States was one of the authors of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Irrespective of party, U.S. leaders have voiced and continue to voice their support for the treaty and the need to promote its consolidation. Spelling out some of his views in a book published just before the elections, new President J. Carter stressed that the problem of nonproliferation in accordance with American

interests must occupy one of the central places in the system of foreign policy priorities. "The proliferation of nuclear weapons," he writes, "represents the greatest waste and the greatest danger. Our ultimate objective must be to eliminate the nuclear potential of all the world's countries."⁴ In a number of his election speeches he stressed the link between the nuclear arms race and the problem of nonproliferation.

Touching on this problem in his 17 March 1977 UN speech--"the President's first statement on foreign policy," as THE WASHINGTON POST put it--J. Carter stated: "We advocate an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world. We will make fresh attempts to reach multilateral agreements designed to safeguard justified supplies of nuclear fuel to other countries while controlling toxic and dangerous waste."⁵

Together with other countries of the world (the USSR, Britain, France, the GDR, the CSSR, Poland, the FRG, Japan, Canada, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden) the United States plays an active role in the annual "London Club" conferences, which examine the principles governing nuclear exports policy and measures to promote the nonproliferation regime.

On the United States' initiative, questions relating to ending the rivalry between the United States, France, and the FRG in the world trade in nuclear technology and also problems relating to the intensification of international control over the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were extensively discussed during Vice President W. Mondale's visit to West European countries and Japan in January 1977. The new administration has resumed intensive bilateral consultations on nonproliferation questions with a number of importers of nuclear technology--Brazil, Pakistan and others. The Congress is continuing to examine a nuclear energy program worked out by the Republican administration. Its main objective is to lessen the danger of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

At the same time, the continuing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the reason American scientists and politicians are seeking ways to improve the regime of nonproliferation and new conceptual approaches to this problem.

Where the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons specifically lies, whether a solution to the problem of nonproliferation exists at all, and what practical steps the United States can take in this direction are the questions underlying the debate underway in the United States.⁶

In What Way Is Proliferation a Threat?

When this question arises, American experts often cite the hypothetical scenario of a "nuclear Armageddon" borrowed from Neville Shute's book "On the Beach."⁷ This scenario paints a really sinister picture of tension "somewhere in southern Europe" evolving rapidly into a local nuclear conflict and subsequently into a universal nuclear catastrophe which buries modern civilization "under mushroom clouds."

The experts stress that this scenario could become a reality in the event of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such apocalyptic prophecies are to be found quite frequently in the American Press.⁸

Few American specialists doubt that an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons threatens disastrous consequences for the whole of mankind. Most of them are agreed that the world's countries face an alternative which needs to be resolved without delay, namely: either reliably blocking the channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or facing an uncontrollable increase in the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The experts believe that this danger could become inevitable in the future, particularly in crisis-wracked regions of the world--the Near East, for example. Thus, R. Pranger and D. Tahtinen (The American Business Institute for the Study of Problems of State Policy) consider that the Near East conflict "will sooner or later become nuclear."⁹

Nevertheless, in American political literature you sometimes come across the claim that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will not necessarily lead to an increase in the risk of nuclear conflict. The proponents of this view argue approximately as follows: If both sides in a potential conflict have nuclear weapons there is automatically a balance between them determined by "mutual deterrence," with the threat of incurring a nuclear strike also making the use of conventional forces impossible. This view of the consequences of proliferation is held by, among others, (R. Sandoval) a military expert from Los Alamos. "If it defends its border with nuclear weapons, any country without territorial ambitions can advance calmly, like a porcupine, through the debris of international relations--it poses no threat to its neighbors and at the same time it is risky for predators to attack it," he writes.¹⁰

However, the experience of past decades, particularly the "cold war" period, shows the opposite. No "automatic balance" emerges from mutual "nuclear deterrence." The "porcupine theory" is harmful and dangerous because it lulls the public and distracts them from the need to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war in general and from the consistent and persistent pursuit of the policy of relaxing international tension. As H. Bull has rightly noted, right up until the start of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks and the signing of the 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war "there was a constant risk of nuclear conflict."¹¹

The overwhelming majority of American researchers regard it as axiomatic that the fewer the number of nuclear powers, the stronger the world security is,¹² and that therefore further proliferation of nuclear weapons will exert a destabilizing influence on international relations. An increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons could jeopardize and sharply reduce the effectiveness of the system of measures formulated with such difficulty to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons between individual countries (the USSR and the United States, and the USSR and France), since a multiplicity of nuclear threats would make it exceptionally difficult to identify the side which had carried out such an action. "If nuclear

arsenals were to multiply throughout the world we would not be able to prevent a nuclear attack by deterring one or two potential adversaries. Our concepts of nuclear deterrence, which are precarious and unreliable anyway, would be ineffective," THE BALTIMORE SUN writes, citing experts' views.¹³

Furthermore, as some American researchers stress, such a prospect could not fail to lead to an increase in distrust between the countries of the world and to an intensification of the atmosphere of fear in the face of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by irresponsible governments or groups of terrorists.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons, they note, poses a serious threat to the successful development of the process of detente in various regions of our planet. An increase in the number of nuclear states would inevitably complicate the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks since "the growth of nuclear potential in third countries could mean that a cutback in their arsenals might prove risky" for the United States and the USSR.¹⁴ W. Epstein, special consultant to the UN secretary general on disarmament questions, notes that in the event of a worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons, the very task of nuclear disarmament could prove "unrealistic and unattainable."¹⁵

But despite the more or less unanimous assessment among American experts of the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons for international relations, substantial differences are perceptible over the degree of U.S. vulnerability posed by the proliferation of these weapons in the world. Thus, F. Ickle and M. Guhin assert that the availability of nuclear weapons to a country lacking modern delivery vehicles does not pose a "direct threat" to the United States with its tremendous nuclear potential.¹⁶ Other people hold a diametrically opposed view, however.

It would be a "dangerous delusion," they state, to assume that long-range missiles or strategic bombers are essential to attack the United States. According to A. Walstetter, a prominent expert in the field of nuclear weapons, "the United States would be within range for even a small distant country able to use simple freighters carrying shortrange missiles as a delivery vehicle."¹⁷ Another specialist, T. Taylor, believes that the United States would be "exceptionally vulnerable" since nuclear weapons can be used by "covert subversive groups." Many prominent American experts, particularly Prof G. Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also C. Yost conclude that a increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons would lead to a relative "leveling down" of U.S. nuclear might and to a decline in its relative weight in the world "nuclear balance" and that this could not fail to have a detrimental impact on U.S. security.¹⁸ Here the view exists among American scientists that the world is possibly only 10-15 years away from "the era of proliferation."¹⁹

Conflicting Approaches to the Problem

Particularly great differences among American experts have emerged over the question of the regime of nonproliferation--the need for it and possible ways to strengthen it. The range of views and opinions expressed by them is extremely wide. However, I believe it is possible to single out three main approaches to this problem.

The first is that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world is to be regarded as an inevitable process since, its proponents attempt to prove, it is impossible to imagine the "threshold" countries resisting the temptation to have such weapons at their disposal. Hence stems a skeptical view of the possibility of formulating effective non-proliferation measures. For example, Prof W. Griffiths of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology asserts that arguments and measures against proliferation belong to "the realms of theology" and that those who resort to them resemble "King Canute ordering the river to stop flowing." "It is clear," he states, "that proliferation is happening, and some people are trying to slow it down while others have no great hopes of success. All this resembles the age-old struggle against sin" and, since the world has lost its "nuclear virginity" it is useless to attempt to save it from nuclear insanity. 20

This concept is particularly dangerous in that it essentially justifies and theoretically "substantiates" a further nuclear arms race. No wonder it finds supporters among the adherents of a "position of strength" policy, supporters of a tough bloc policy, and also sponsors of nuclear supplies for NATO countries. For example, Griffiths argues for "new centers of nuclear might," particularly the creation of joint West European nuclear forces. At the same time some developed capitalist countries, using the thesis of the "inevitability" of the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a pretext, are engaged in world trade in nuclear technology, deriving billions in profit from it. As the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL (15 March 1976) testifies, "they are virtually unconcerned whether this technology is to be used for peaceful or military purposes."

The second approach or avenue observed in American political thinking is characterized by the fact that its representatives are inclined to view the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in isolation from practical U.S. policy in the field of nuclear arms. As a rule they support the nonproliferation treaty and verbally acknowledge the urgent need to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. However, they attempt to reduce all policy in this field to measures to control the use of nuclear installations and materials by other countries. Their inconsistency becomes particularly obvious when the question arises of amending U.S. military policy so that the U.S. nuclear arsenal does not serve as a spur for other countries to create their own nuclear weapons. The representatives of this school of thought state that U.S. security interests take precedence over all considerations linked with nonproliferation, that it is essential, no matter what, to prevent a change in the "nuclear balance" in the Soviet Union's favor, and

that it is therefore essential to continue to improve U.S. nuclear potential and strive for superiority over the USSR.²¹ It is not surprising that the blinders of "bipolar" thinking prevent them from making an objective and sober assessment of the degree of danger of proliferation to the security of the United States itself. Assessing the shortsightedness of this approach, Prof G. Rathjens stresses: "If you look at the defense secretary's annual reports on U.S. military requirements you will hardly find a half a page devoted to the problem of nonproliferation. You will find hundreds of pages to the effect that we 'need this' to 'respond to what the Soviet Union is doing' and so forth.... But you will find barely a mention in the report about what is happening in the rest of the world."²²

Among the supporters of this second approach the interests of strengthening the regime of nonproliferation inevitably take second place to the tasks of the "nuclear reinforcement" of the North Atlantic Alliance and the creation of "additional counterweights" to the socialist community countries. A number of American experts (for example, A. Pierre, member of the influential American Council of Foreign Relations) urging the United States to support the idea of creating West European nuclear forces on the basis of the British and French nuclear potential, asserts that the problem of nonproliferation "does not apply to the Atlantic region" and that the "main threat" stems from the countries of the "Third World."²³

Ambiguity in the approach to the solution of the problems of nonproliferation is also manifested when it comes to talking about reducing the U.S. nuclear potential abroad or about the United States refusing to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Military experts are beginning to warn that such actions would lead to an undermining of Washington's "nuclear commitment's to its allies and could encourage them to decide to embark on the path of independent nuclear armament. Dissociating themselves from the thesis that the United States' military alliances with other countries constitute a reliable guarantee against proliferation, they are persistently urging a tough bloc policy relying on U.S. nuclear might.²⁴

However in 1952 Britain, although already a NATO member, tested a nuclear device of its own, and was followed in 1960 by another bloc member--France (before its withdrawal from the NATO military organizations). This testifies that U.S. bloc policy encourages rather than curbs the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this connection a number of American researchers, particularly R. Still, stress that the United States generally exaggerates its influence on its bloc allies and is incapable of dissuading them from a policy of independent nuclear armament" "Whether or not we continue with our NATO commitments we will hardly be able to control the behavior of Germany or Japan as in the past."²⁵ It is impossible not to note that the new U.S. administration's attempts to stop its allies from selling nuclear reactors and reprocessors of nuclear fuel (France to Pakistan and the FRG to Brazil) have so far failed.

Influential political circles linked in one way or another with the military-industrial complex, who regard bloc policy and "nuclear pressure" as fundamental elements of Washington's foreign policy course, align themselves with the second school of thought.

A third school is progressing and developing rapidly in the United States at this time. Its supporters believe that further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world can and must be stopped. In their view, to achieve this it is first and foremost essential to formulate a comprehensive approach to the solution of this problem which would be backed up by constructive changes in Washington's policy on questions relating to U.S. nuclear potential. Representatives of this school--G. Rathjens, G. Quester, M. Bloomfield, W. Epstein, C. Yost, H. Scoville and others--believe that there is a need for a profound reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy priorities from the vantage point of the threat of proliferation since it is their profound conviction that precisely this threat could prove to be the main danger for the United States and the world community as a whole.

The supporters of this school of thought also consider that the nonproliferation treaty must remain the central element of an entire set of measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. While attaching great importance to further improvements in the system of control over nuclear installations and materials and advocating an end to the rivalry in the field of trade in nuclear reactors, they also warn that the problem of nonproliferation cannot be resolved by technical measures alone. In this connection M. Guhin stresses: "A decision by any country to create nuclear weapons stems not from assessments of the ease or complexity with which this task can be fulfilled but from the intentions of its leaders arising from their interpretation of their national interests."²⁶

Furthermore, they note the fact that under conditions of relative accessibility of nuclear technology the center of gravity of the struggle against proliferation is gradually shifting from the technical to the political field. As a result, the main efforts in this field must be aimed at reducing and ultimately neutralizing the influence of those political and military factors in present-date international relations which can still cause countries to aspire to create their own nuclear weapons.

Recommendations

Most of the experts mentioned consider that one of the tasks in the matter of nonproliferation is to dissuade the "subnuclear" countries from acquiring nuclear weapons since possession of these weapons will in the final analysis not yield any economic, political, or military benefit.²⁷ To back up this thesis, American political scientists, particularly H. York, R. Still, and S. Hoffman, often point to the consequences which the nuclear arms race has had for the United States.

In the postwar period the United States spent colossal amounts on improving its nuclear forces while military spending by other Western countries was much more moderate, which enabled them to allocate additional capital for economic development (for example, Japanese expenditure was less than 1 per cent of U.S. expenditure). As a result the nonnuclear countries--the FRG and Japan, which have considerably outstripped the United States in terms of rate of development--have become powerful economic rivals.

In the foreign policy field the possession of nuclear weapons has not prevented serious failures for the United States in the international arena. Attempts to use these weapons as a means of political blackmail or pressure have not had the desired results in relations with the socialist states, the countries of the "Third World," or the main Western allies. The latter have frequently sought to dissociate themselves from Washington's political course at times of international crisis (during the Indochina war and the October 1973 hostilities in the Near East, for example) for fear of becoming involved. Reflecting the widespread disappointment with nuclear weapons as an instrument of foreign policy, former U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger was compelled to acknowledge in his book "American Foreign Policy" that at the present stage nuclear might cannot be directly converted into political dividends for American interests.²⁸

It has become a generally recognized fact that the nuclear arms race has not only not helped to strengthen U.S. "national security" but, on the contrary, has weakened it considerably. Whereas previously continental U.S. territory was considered almost invulnerable, with the development of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons "the threat of being completely destroyed in the event of a thermonuclear conflict" loomed over America.²⁹

Thus, U.S. historical experience testifies quite convincingly that possession of nuclear weapons has not brought American interests the economic, political, and military dividends which Washington hoped for in the postwar period but has become one of the contributing factors to the decline in the United States' role in international relations in the mid-seventies. Similar consequences will inevitably overtake other countries which want to acquire nuclear weapons of their own and participate in the nuclear arms race. It is no accident that an understanding of this has already caused a number of industrially developed countries (such as Canada, Japan and Sweden) to resolve not to embark on the path of nuclear armament.

As concrete political steps along the path of improving the regime of non-proliferation G. Rathjens, W. Epstein, and G. Kennan insistently recommend that the U.S. ruling circles abandon the propagandizing of all possible kinds of doctrines relating to the use of nuclear weapons. This propaganda not only does considerable damage to the creation of a new international climate free of fear of the atom bomb but also increases the incentive for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. As well-known American public figure S. Lens, for example, has noted, the United States "willy-nilly, by its own example" is contributing to the spread of the nuclear danger in the world.³⁰

Drawing attention to the manifest contradiction between the Pentagon's current military-strategic concepts and Washington's support for measures against the administration to officially state that it renounces the first use of nuclear weapons, A. Fisher, former deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, warns: "We are attempting to encourage nations to

accede to and support the nonproliferation treaty while at the same time endeavoring to prove that displaying restraint in nuclear bombing matters... does not apply to U.S. foreign policy."³¹

American experts believe that U.S. military bases abroad are essentially becoming an encouragement to further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this connection they mention that approximately 7,000 nuclear weapons are stored on U.S. bases in Western Europe alone. According to certain authoritative specialists from the Brookings Institute, this number could be reduced to 2,000 without detriment to the American forces.³² The United States has a total of some 22,000 nuclear weapons abroad. Experts, particularly Admiral La Roque, warn that half-measures or a partial cutback in these stockpiles would have no effect and that what is needed is the complete elimination of all U.S. military bases where there are nuclear weapons.³³

American scientists and politicians are particularly concerned about the plans to further expand the U.S. "nuclear presence" abroad. In particular, the creation of a nuclear base on Diego Garcia could, in their view, become a catalyst for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean zone.³⁴ This would obviously lead to the irreversible loss of the relatively favorable possibilities for proclaiming this region a nuclear-free zone.

As an alternative to a U.S. nuclear presence abroad the supporters of non-proliferation urge the U.S. ruling circles to display a more constructive approach to the proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones or zones of peace, stressing that political considerations linked with the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons must take precedence over desires to acquire strong strategic positions in given regions.

At the present time there is a considerable number of scientists and politicians in the United States who believe that the continuation of the nuclear arms race, and particularly the creation of new nuclear missile systems, is in direct contradiction to nonproliferation policy. W. Epstein, G. Rathjens, S. Lens, G. Kennan, H. York, and others warn that, whether the United States likes it or not, this kind of course objectively testifies that important significance continues to be attached to nuclear weapons as a means of conduct in military operations. The August 1976 Pugwash scientists' conference on disarmament problems also drew attention to this aspect of the problem.

An awareness of the direct interconnection between the problems of nuclear disarmament and the problems of nonproliferation led to the emergence in Congress of a group (S. Symington, A. Stevenson, H. Humphrey, A. Cranston, J. Pastore, G. McGovern, E. Kennedy, and C. Zablocki) advocating the need to prevent further proliferation by limiting and reducing nuclear potential. On this grouping's initiative a resolution demanding that the administration implement more effective measures in this direction was adopted in May 1976.³⁵

The supporters of a resolute struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons are insistently recommending the administration to strive for the conclusion of new agreements in this field.

K. Littenberg of Cornell University, W. Epstein, and others, stressing the inadmissibility of a break in the Soviet-American talks, consider that a lack of significant progress on strategic arms limitation could become "a handy pretext and justification" for any country, irrespective of whether or not it is party to the treaty, to embark on the path of nuclear armament.³⁶

It is precisely in view of the reality of this threat that prominent scientists and political figures consider that the United States must, in its own interests, strive for progress in the nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR. Senator A. Cranston stresses: "We must not and cannot let the strategic arms limitation talks slow down and get deadlocked." Senators S. Symington, J. Glenn, and A. Ribicoff and Congressman C. Long urge Washington to strive for closer and more constructive cooperation with the USSR on nonproliferation questions and to insure that ideological differences do not prevent the solution of a problem whose solution will determine whether mankind will enter the 21st century in good shape.³⁷

In this connection American scientists and political figures point up the insistent need for the further positive development of U.S.-Soviet relations in general. There was a great response to the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes signed between the USSR and the United States in May 1976.³⁸ As the New York TIMES wrote on 31 May 1976: "The prime importance of the new treaty is that it discourages the supporters of the spread of nuclear weapon technology throughout the world."

As a next step along the path toward nonproliferation they insistently recommend embarking on discussions of the possibilities for concluding a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

Thus, in formulating their recommendations American scientists and political figures who support the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons reach the conclusion that a policy in this sphere can lead to effective results only if the United States follows the path of nuclear disarmament and strives to lessen the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its foreign and military policy. In broader terms, in their view, the U.S. foreign policy course in the world arena must be aimed at eliminating existing hotbeds of tension and preventing new ones and at resolving disputed issues not with the aid of force but at the negotiating table along the paths of the development of the processes of detente. In the final analysis it is precisely the relaxation of tension which encourages moderation on the part of other states in the question of whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons of their own--that is, in resolving the tasks of their proliferation.

The menacing consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world dictates to the U.S. ruling circles the urgent need for a cardinal reappraisal of the fundamental postulates of U.S. foreign and military policy and for the renunciation of the use or threat of force as the main instrument of policy in the international arena. The successful resolution of the task of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons presupposes as an immutable condition a realistic course aimed at detente and disarmament and at mutual understanding and cooperation among all the states of the world.

The entire set of initiatives and proposals from the USSR and the other socialist countries in the field of ending the arms race and disarmament is aimed at creating an international climate conducive to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They include proposals on the speediest conclusion of a new Soviet-U.S. strategic arms limitation agreement, the total prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the convening of a conference of nuclear states to examine the problems of nuclear disarmament, renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons in relations among the countries which signed the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a readiness to positively examine both the idea of creating zones of peace in various regions and the draft treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations submitted for examination by the 31st UN General Assembly session. A constructive approach toward these initiatives on the part of the United States and practical steps to implement President J. Carter's statements on the need to end the nuclear arms race could make a considerable contribution to the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, Moscow, 1976, p 23.
2. SIPRI Director F. Barnaby wrote in the 6 January 1977 edition of the British journal NEW SCIENTIST that "the technical knowledge needed to design and manufacture nuclear weapons is now widely accessible and sufficient fissionable material for the atom bombs a year--using a 60-megawatt graphite (or heavy water) reactor. The components of such a reactor can be purchased freely on the market...".
3. PRAVDA, 30 September 1976.
4. J. Carter, "Why Not the Best?" New York, 1976, p 178.
5. THE WASHINGTON POST, 18 March 1977.
6. This article does not claim to provide comprehensive coverage of the debate on the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the United States. In particular it does not examine such questions as the trade in nuclear material, control over the use of such material, the risk of nuclear weapons being stolen and so forth. The accent is on the military-political aspects of the approaches to the solution of the problem as a whole proposed in the United States.
7. N. Shute, "On the Beach," New York, 1957.
8. See, for example, "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, September 1974, pp 3-4, TIME, 9 September 1974.

9. R. Pranger, D. Tahtinen, "Nuclear Threat in the Middle East," Washington, 1975, preface.
10. The BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May 1976, p 19.
11. H. Bull, "Rethinking Nonproliferation," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, April 1975, pp 177-79.
12. H. Owen and C. Schultze, ed., "Setting National Priorities: The Next 10 Years, Washington, 1976, pp 129-165; G. Quester, "The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation," New York, 1973.
13. THE BALTIMORE SUN, 16 November 1976.
14. "Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications," Hearings, House of Representatives, October-November 1975, p 238).
15. W. Epstein, "The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control," New York, 1976.
16. "Nuclear Proliferation," Hearings, p 238; M. Guhin, "Nuclear Paradox," Washington, 1976, p 3.
17. FOREIGN POLICY, No 25, Winter 1975-1976, p 165.
18. "Nuclear Proliferation," Hearings, pp 55, 84, 238.
19. "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic Energy Agency," analytic report, Washington, March 1976.
20. TIME, 2 June 1975, p 11.
21. "Nuclear Proliferation," Hearings, p 37.
22. Ibid., p 76.
23. A. Pierre, "Nuclear Politics," New York, 1972, p 341.
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31. "Nuclear Proliferation," Hearings p 33.
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35. For more detail see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1976 pp 88-93.
36. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, 1975, p 189.
37. "Nuclear Proliferation," Hearings, pp 13, 19; THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 March 1976; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 July 1976.
38. For the text of the treaty and a commentary entitled "In the Interests of International Peace" see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1976.

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THE AMERICAN INDIAN TODAY

Moskow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 34-44

[Article by N. P. Moykin]

[Summary] When the Europeans first came to America, this territory was inhabited by several million Indians. At the beginning of the 20th century, only 250,000 remained. The rest had been killed by the bullets of the European settlers and the diseases that they had brought with them. Since that time, the native population of the United States has increased and, according to the 1970 census, amounts to around 800,000. These Indians represent 300 tribes and 100 living languages.

Most of the American Indians live on reservations in the American Southwest. In all, there are 268 Indian reservations in the United States. More than 300,000 native Americans live in the ghettos of the nation's largest cities. The average annual income of the Indian family is less than half of the official poverty level in the United States. Rates of unemployment on reservations range from 20 percent to 75 percent and the rate of Indian unemployment in some cities is 40 percent. The average life span of the American Indian is 44 years. The rate of Indian infant mortality is three times higher than the rate for the white population. The rate of suicide for Indian adolescents is three times higher than the nationwide rate for white adolescents.

These statistics would seem to indicate that American "civilization" has ignored the Indians, but this has not been the case. It has invaded their territories and unceremoniously destroyed their culture, customs and traditions. As a result of the invasion of their reservations, the native Americans are losing their most treasured possession--land. During the Eisenhower Administration, the federal government instituted a program for the "adaptation" of the Indian population to modern American life. This was used as a pretext for seizing Indian lands. As a result of this policy, the reservations of five Indian tribes have already disappeared. And the American Federal Government, the Army and corporations have not ceased this robbery. Indian territories now occupy less than 2 percent of the total area of the 48 continental states. During 1970 alone, more than 200,000 acres were taken away from the Indians.

The Indians have received almost nothing from this "adaptation" but a meager amount of unemployment compensation and isolated cases of job placement. According to many American sociologists and historians, the Indians have been subjected to assimilation and deprived of their land but have not been given the elementary social and political rights.

The American Indians of the last quarter of the 20th century are not reconciling themselves to this situation. They are using various tactics and means to avoid being completely absorbed by the "white civilization" and smothered by economic restrictions. The government is taking stern counter-measures against the Indian movement. Ruling circles in the United States love to display a hypocritical concern for the rights of the individual in foreign countries. The time has come for them to concern themselves with the rights of the individual in their own country. The treatment of the American Indians graphically illustrates the way in which human rights are unceremoniously trampled upon in the United States.

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PYGMIES AND GIANTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 45-51

[Article by Ernst Henry]

[Summary] Sixty years ago a great event occurred in a certain nation--an event so great that it changed the face of the earth once and for all. All of the big political changes since this time have been directly or indirectly conditioned by this event, which marked the beginning of a new era in history. This was the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. A few months later, there were some ridiculous goings-on in the capital of another large country. In February and March 1919, an investigation resembling a trial was held in the U.S. Senate by a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. The defendant was the October Revolution.

The subcommittee was formed to learn more about the revolution and to explain it to the American public. The records of the meetings of this subcommittee make up a portfolio of more than a thousand pages. Not one of the members spoke Russian or knew anything about Russia. It is highly improbable that any of the five senators on the subcommittee had read a single book about revolution or socialism.

The members of the subcommittee were typical Babbitts; they were professional businessmen and lawyers from cities in the American provinces.

The testimony presented at the hearings was unfounded and absurd. For example, one senator announced that a Russian emigrant who had taught at a school for young ladies of the nobility for more than 20 years had told him that the Bolshevik Government was being advised by German officers. Another senator reported that marriage had been outlawed and free love had been instituted. He said that every woman between the ages of 18 and 45 had to report to the commissariat, where she was assigned to a man, with whom she would then have to live, regardless of whether she wished to or not. Another witness testified that the Red Army and Red Guard were being commanded by Germans. The former U.S. ambassador to Russia said that the Bolsheviks were killing anyone who wore a white collar or had an education.

Perhaps the most absurd piece of testimony was the expressed conviction that the system of Soviet rule was doomed to failure for three reasons: a shortage of raw materials, a shortage of experienced leaders and the disinclination of the people to work. Time has shown that all of these statements were utter lies. It has now become much more difficult to lie about the Soviet Union and about communism, but the lies have not stopped. The days of primitive anti-Soviet propaganda have receded into the past, but more subtle methods have been found. Questions connected with the transmission of "information" about the Soviet Union to the American public are now being decided by other people, on another level and for other purposes. For example, the public is now being warned about the mythical "Soviet military threat."

If the October Revolution is to be put on trial, the case will not be judged by the U.S. Senate, but by world history. For the last 60 years, the verdict has been in favor of the defendant.

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A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH IS NECESSARY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 52-54 LD

[Article by V. M. Berezhev]

[Text] Assessing the importance of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow and the talks the Soviet leaders held with him, A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, said at his press conference 31 March: "...The secretary of state's visit was necessary and even useful because we must get to know one another well. I do not mean a superficial acquaintance, but knowledge of the positions, knowledge of the policies of the countries on the corresponding problems."

It should be stressed that this was the first contact between a high-ranking representative of the new Washington administration and the Soviet leaders. And so it is natural that questions of Soviet-American relations and certain international problems of mutual interest to the USSR and the United States were discussed in principle during the talks.

Over the past 5 years much has been done to normalize Soviet-American relations. Mutually advantageous cooperation is developing successfully in many specific areas. However, movement on the cardinal problems has been retarded lately. This pause has been used by detente's opponents to launch a propaganda offensive in order to complicate the situation and impede further talks, particularly on arms limitation and reduction.

President Carter's new administration which came to power in Washington last January displayed a certain duality as early as the first weeks of its activity. On the one hand its representatives made a number of statements in favor of continuing to normalize relations between the United States and the USSR. On the other hand they deemed it possible to join in the noisy provocative campaign about "human rights" which is obviously calculated to sow mistrust of the Soviet Union and thereby complicate the atmosphere at the upcoming talks on practical questions of Soviet-American relations. It was in this specific atmosphere that Secretary of State Vance's visit to Moscow took place.

As the communique published in Moscow 31 March noted, the examination of questions on completing the preparation of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms occupied a central place in the talks of L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, with U.S. Secretary of State Vance and it was agreed to continue the discussion of these questions. Opinions were also exchanged on a number of other problems of arms limitation and disarmament. Topics relating to the upcoming meeting in Belgrade and the situations in Cyprus and in southern Africa were also touched upon. The sides reaffirmed the great importance of the four-power agreement of 3 September 1971. Particular attention was paid to the Near East situation. The participants in the talks agreed that cooperation between the USSR and the United States--the cochairmen of the Geneva Near East peace conference--is vitally important for achieving a just and lasting peace in that region.

It is well-known that the March talks with Vance revealed substantial differences between the USSR and U.S. positions on the problem of limiting offensive strategic arms and completing a corresponding agreement. A. A. Gromyko talked in detail about the essence of these differences at his 31 March press conference.

The Soviet side adheres strictly to the accord reached at the end of 1974 in Vladivostok between L. I. Brezhnev and the then U.S. President G. Ford. The basic content of this accord is that the USSR and the United States will each have 2,400 strategic weapons delivery vehicles, including 1,320 MIRVed missiles. Some progress was made after the Vladivostok meeting. There was a possibility of carrying things through and concluding a new long-term agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic armaments. But this did not occur, and for reasons for which the Soviet side can in no way bear the responsibility. Meanwhile, the line of revising the commitments jointly undertaken in Vladivostok began to prevail in Washington.

At his 31 March press conference in Moscow USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko stressed that the Soviet side is categorically opposed to such a revision. "We advocate," he declared, "that the edifice which was built with such labor in Vladivostok and on which so many intellectual and other resources were expended not only be preserved but that matters be carried through a new strategic arms limitation agreement be concluded between the USSR and the United States."

Since Vance's visit to Moscow many dissertations have appeared in the Western press about the new American proposals which have been advertised by Washington as the "basis for a broad, all-embracing agreement." The essence of these proposals consists in reducing the number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles to 2,000 or even 1,800 units and the number of MIRVed missiles to 1,200-1,100. At the same time it is proposed to eliminate 50 percent of Soviet missiles which some people in the United States simply do not like--they call them "too heavy." This proposal manifestly runs counter to the Vladivostok accord insofar as it disrupts the established balanced nature of limitations--the balanced nature that the sides agreed upon in 1974.

Vance also submitted a proposal that the right of both sides to modernize existing missiles--a right enshrined in the agreement currently in force as well as in the Vladivostok accord--be reviewed. And in this sphere as well a break in the accord is proposed in such a way that the United States obtains advantages and the Soviet Union finds itself in a worse position. Of course the Soviet side could not deviate from the principle of equality in this respect either.

The second, so-called alternative or narrow proposal put forward by Vance proved equally unacceptable.

As we can see in the Moscow talks, the U.S. secretary of state attempted to pursue a line aimed at revising the accords adopted in Vladivostok. The proposals he brought essentially signified an attempt to obtain one-sided advantages for the United States to the detriment of the security of the USSR and its friends and allies.

The new American proposals were preceded by a lengthy propaganda campaign in the United States and the other Western countries to distort the meaning of the Vladivostok accord. The USSR was made to appear to be receiving some kind of one-sided advantage as a result of this accord.

In fact all this is shameless misrepresentation of the facts. Even certain representatives of the former Washington administration, explaining the essence of the accord reached in Vladivostok, assessed this propaganda campaign in precisely this way: The whole point is that, while they possess approximate equality (parity), the USSR and the United States have, within the framework of this equality, appreciable differences (asymmetries) in individual components of their armed forces. These differences are related to their different geographical situations, with the character of the possible threats to their security, with the technical characteristics of individual weapon systems and with the traditions of military building in general. And so a mechanical comparison of the USSR and the United States would be erroneous.

While they expatiate about Soviet "advantages," the opponents of the accord remain silent about the United States' highly significant superiority in terms of the quantity of missile warheads, about the existence of a network of American overseas bases which make it possible to use submarines carrying ballistic missiles more effectively and about the large numbers of American nuclear weapons located on the near approaches to the USSR ("forward-based forces"). Finally, the fact that America is separated from the rest of the world by two oceans and that its neighbors are Canada and Mexico--friendly countries which do not threaten it militarily--is of substantial importance. By contrast, the Soviet Union has to protect tremendously long borders with not only friendly states. All these circumstances must be taken into account in elaborating approaches to the problem of balanced arms limitation.

In the past 2 1/2 years nothing has changed in the factors cited above. Therefore there are no apparent grounds whatsoever for revising the existing accord.

The attempt at a revision of this kind naturally prompts the question: Just what would happen if, with the accession of a new leadership in a country, everything positive achieved in the course of talks with the previous administration were canceled? For in that case there could be no question of any stability in relations among states. It is characteristic that many American press organs are highly critical in their response to Washington's position and operating methods. WASHINGTON POST commentator Marder, who was among the correspondents accompanying Vance to Moscow, notes that, according to informed sources, the Carter administration made serious miscalculations in its assessments of how the new American proposals--which were approved, Marder stresses, only 2 days before the secretary of state's departure for the USSR--would be received in the Soviet Union.

The haste with which the White House stated that if the strategic arms limitation talks failed, the United States would create and deploy new strategic arms systems cannot fail to arouse regret. It is not difficult to see that, by embarking on this path, Washington would assume all the responsibility for the consequences of actions of this kind. It would be much more sensible to make the necessary efforts to curb the arms race and to insure a positive outcome of the talks.

It was not by chance that the United States came to realize the urgent need to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and in this connection to limit armaments. The whole development of the international situation, the unprecedented danger of nuclear conflict for the world's peoples and the importance of pooling efforts to solve the worsening problems confronting our planet's inhabitants led to this. And if some people in the United States now want to revert to whipping up the arms race and confrontation, they will eventually arrive at a situation analogous to that which was created at the end of the sixties when Washington's ruling circles were forced to conclude that a transition from the "era of confrontation to an era of negotiation" with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries was necessary. But valuable time would be irretrievably lost and many problems common to all mankind would be complicated still further.

No one is going to deny that there are complexities in relations between the USSR and the United States. But the prospects for these relations can be viewed with optimism if they are built on the basic principles of equality and identical security, mutual advantage and noninterference in internal affairs.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its consistent, principled position is well known. L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, reaffirmed this in his 5 April speech in the Kremlin. "Our program goal," he stressed, "is to insure the solution of one of the most important tasks of our time--the task of limiting and ending the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.

"Objectively speaking, there would seem to be quite a good base, particularly in Soviet-American relations, for practical steps in this direction. Of course, it must be strengthened and broadened. But as recent contacts and talks have shown, instead of moving forward, our partners are losing their constructive approach and are taking a one-sided position.

"A reasonable accord is possible; but not only we, the other side as well must be fully aware of our responsibility with respect to curbing the arms race and must seek mutually acceptable decisions not in words but in deeds."

The meeting between the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States in Geneva planned for the first half of May is testimony to the sides' readiness to continue the talks. According to the existing accord, a profound exchange of opinions on the Near East problem, including the question of resuming the Geneva conference's work, is to be held at this meeting. At the same time the examination of certain other questions from among those discussed at the Moscow talks will be continued. It must be hoped that this meeting will be marked by positive results.

CSO: 1803

BEFORE THE RESUMPTION OF UN LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 56-62 LD

[Article by Ye. Ye. Yakovin]

[Text] The sixth session of the Third UN Law of the Sea [LOS] Conference, which opens in New York on 23 May, will continue its work on drawing up a unified convention which as a complex or "package," as it is customarily described at the conference, is designed to solve the most important and complex issues of the exploitation by states of various regions of the world's oceans and their resources.

The Soviet Union has made a substantial contribution to insuring the success of the conference. The main point is that the USSR's general line and the thrust of all its proposals and specific steps are aimed at achieving an acceptable international settlement of the main issues of the law of the sea taking into account the legitimate interests of various states. Under the conditions of the acute aggravation or real "flare-up" of antagonisms among states on questions of the rules relating to maritime resources and their exploitation, socialism is against dividing up the world's oceans and favors transforming it into a zone of international cooperation.

The conference has done a great deal of constructive work at its recent sessions. A draft convention which can be used as a basis for reaching mutually acceptable solutions on many key issues was prepared as a result of the talks among various groups of states. Compromise clauses defining a 12-mile limit for territorial waters, unimpeded passage of ships and aircraft through straits used for international shipping and a number of others* met with wide support among the various groups of states.

At the same time certain tendencies which are having an extremely adverse effect on the course of the multilateral talks within the conference framework cannot be overlooked. Thus, an increasing number of states have

* For more detail see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1975 and No 5, 1976

recently been setting up economic and fishing zones extending up to 200 miles from their shores without waiting for the completion of the conference's work on the conclusion of an international convention on the law of the sea. Moreover, some countries are continuing to insist on extending their territorial waters beyond the generally recognized limits of 12 nautical miles in contravention of international law. Unilateral actions are creating new conditions for the legitimate activities in the world's oceans of other states, forcing them to resort to retaliatory measures in order to defend their coastal regions, rights and interests. Meanwhile there is a persistent tendency in the position of some delegations to dictate unilateral and arbitrary formulas which have nothing in common with an acceptable international settlement of various issues of the law of the sea and which have an adverse effect on the pace of work.

At the same time it would be a mistake to suppose that the negative tendencies define the main substance of the conference's work. On the contrary, as a whole the progress of the talks reflects the desire of the majority of states to seek mutually acceptable solutions of the key issues, although this demands time and patience.

Unilateral Acts and the Conference

The first question on the eve of the sixth session of the conference arises in connection with the fact that a number of littoral countries, acting unilaterally (or with a common declaration in the case of the Common Market countries), are establishing 200-mile economic or fishing zones.

Such offshore zones have been established since 1 January 1977 by Canada, Norway, and also Britain, Ireland, Denmark and other Common Market countries. Similar actions were carried out earlier by a number of developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Their national laws on the establishment of such zones are interpreted in peculiar fashion and frequently completely ignore the main substance of the basic provisions on establishing a 200-mile economic zone which were the outcome of prolonged work and are enshrined in section I of the unofficial draft convention. But it is not only a question of this disparity, which reflects a tendency to interpret arbitrarily the norms of international law agreed on at the conference. Such actions also signify an attempt to sever the vital link of a unified "package" of main issues, extract one of them--on the 200-mile economic zone--and present the conference with a fait accompli. In this respect, without even touching on the question of their compliance (or, more precisely, their noncompliance) with the clauses of the draft convention, such acts have no foundation in international law and can in no way be a substitute for the convention which is being worked out by the conference and which is called upon to settle the entire complex of the legal problems of the world's oceans.

Way back in April 1976, when the work of the fourth session of the conference in New York was in full swing, former U.S. President Ford signed a law establishing a 200-mile fishing zone off the shores of the United States.

The period of deferment of its validation expired 28 February 1977 and it became effective on 1 March. The Soviet Union had earlier registered a protest and warned of the serious consequences of such a step by the United States. Unfortunately the Ford administration was unable to halt the process which led to the passage of this law and forced the resignation of a number of leaders of the U.S. delegation to the conference.

The U.S. act not only caused the former administration's official statements in support of the conference to be left hanging in the air. It brought about an exacerbation of the negative tendency and a whole "avalanche" of similar acts on the part of other countries. And who can define precisely how this will influence the fragile, delicate system of complex talks which are being held within the framework of the conference?

The area of the "fishing zones" proclaimed by the United States amounts to no less than 2.2 million square miles (62 percent of its territory). Moreover, U.S. fishermen take the lesser part of the permitted catch in that zone (approximately 2.6 million tons) so that references to the interests of the national fishing industry in justification of this action can hardly be considered well-founded.

In the course of the fifth, fall session of the UN LOS Conference held in New York a high ranking U.S. spokesman made statements that its participants "must not use threats of confrontation against each other, since the benefit gained with this method is negligible compared with the advantages--not only for certain countries but also for the whole of mankind--contained in this process of talks." It is impossible not to agree with such statements. But unfortunately the actions of the U.S. administration do not accord with its professed good wishes in support of the conference.

Of course, the U.S. law differs from the acts of other countries in that it does not establish a 200-mile economic zone and applies only to the fishing industry. However, its main provisions are aimed at creating such a complex bureaucratic barrier against foreign fishermen in the "fishing zone" proclaimed by the United States that it cannot be said that these provisions comply with the main principles enshrined in the draft convention regarding the fishing industry.

The draft convention (Article 51, Section II) particularly provides for a littoral state to promote the optimum exploitation of live resources in the zone. If that state lacks the potential to extract its full permissible catch it is obliged to grant other states access to the surplus by means of agreements and other measures. As we see, this is not a privilege which may be granted (or otherwise) by the U.S. authorities to foreign fishermen on the basis of arbitrarily defined conditions but the right of other countries to the unexploited portion of the permissible catch--a right directly linked with the central principle of the optimum exploitation of live resources.

Importance also attaches to those provisions of the draft convention which stipulate that in determining the permissible catch in a zone a littoral

state must proceed on the basis of all the scientific data available to it and must cooperate with international organizations. Instead of the essentially discriminatory principle of "reciprocity" the draft convention proceeds on the basis that the procedure for fishing in a zone must take into account not only the rights of the littoral state but also the legitimate interests of other countries whose fishermen have traditionally fished in the given zone.

These key provisions of the draft convention are so transformed in U.S. law that it is difficult for foreign fishermen to avail themselves of their promised quota of that part of the permissible catch which the Americans do not take, since the conditions and procedure for concluding new agreements create opportunities for arbitrary actions by the authorities. For instance, the provisions on foreign catch quotas can be virtually nullified by complex bureaucratic obstacles and procedures and also by the establishment of unjustifiably high fees for an agreement and other such measures. In order to obtain permission to fish every foreign state that concludes a fishing agreement with the United States must fulfill every possible kind of requirement. The U.S. secretary of commerce is empowered to set any conditions and restrictions and he can completely withhold permission to fish. The introduction of the principle of "reciprocity," the creation of a complex system of regional commissions, the extensive opportunities for arbitrarily establishing the scale of the permissible catch and fees [sbory], the endowment of the U.S. authorities with powers to persecute foreign fishermen to the extent of imprisoning them and the repudiation of multilateral agreements currently in force--these and other legislative provisions essentially do not accord with the draft convention.

The Soviet Union, in spite of the serious consequences of the establishment of 200-mile economic or fishing zones by a number of states, including its neighbors, has not embarked on that path. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On temporary measures to preserve the live resources and to control fishing in the maritime regions adjacent to the USSR" published 10 October 1976 reflects the Soviet Government's position aimed at seeking an acceptable solution of important questions of the law of the sea within the framework of the conference.

The decree differs from the U.S. law and the acts of other states first and foremost in that it does not create any kind of economic or fishing zones around the Soviet coast, nor does it contain any arbitrary provisions against foreign fishing industry. It contains no artificial barriers and obstacles and no persecution by imprisonment of foreign fishermen.*

The Soviet legislative enactment follows the provisions of the draft convention. Acknowledging sovereign rights over fish and other live resources for the purpose of locating, exploiting and preserving them, the decree consolidates the principle of optimum exploitation of those resources on the basis

*For more detail see NOVOYE VREMYA, No 52, 1976.

of the appropriate scientific data and, in appropriate cases, taking into account the recommendations of competent international organizations.

Under the decree the total annual permissible catch of every kind of fish and other live resources will be specified along with the proportion which can be taken by foreign fishing vessels if the total permissible catch of any kind of commercial stock exceeds the productive capacity of the Soviet fishing industry. This reflects one of the key provisions of the draft convention on access for foreign fishermen in the event of the entire permissible catch not being taken by the littoral state itself.

Taking into account the situation developing in various littoral regions and the acute need for emergency steps to preserve their live resources, the Soviet Government is introducing temporary measures in certain regions, taking into account at the same time the fact that neighboring states have already established 200-mile economic or fishing zones. The rules introduced by the Soviet Union to preserve the live resources of those regions are based on the decree and accord with the draft convention. They are aimed against violations of its main provisions and possible abuses.

The Soviet Union, the decree says, will continue to favor a settlement of the pressing problems of the world's oceans on an international basis and, to this end, the conclusion of a convention which would solve those problems, in particular questions of the exploitation of the live resources of littoral waters, comprehensively and interdependently, taking into account the legitimate interests of all states. This line, which is central to the entire decree, reveals its real political significance as an enactment in support of the conference aimed at normalizing the situation on the eve of its sixth session.

A real settlement of the question of 200-mile economic zones can only be insured in the context of a mutually acceptable international convention. The Soviet step balances out the potential tilt toward a unilateral solution of this question and stresses the purely temporary nature of any enactments, which have to give way to a settlement in international law within the framework of a unified convention.

Unsolved Problems of the Seabed

It has been decided that the sixth session of the conference will devote primary attention to key issues connected with the creation and activity of an international body on the resources of the seabed beyond the continental shelf. Disagreements on these issues at the last, fall session in New York prevented the conference from essentially making any progress and are impeding the entire process of the formulation of a convention.

In the course of the talks many difficulties in this sphere too were successfully overcome. General questions of the rules governing the international region of the seabed beyond the continental shelf were coordinated, the outline of the future international body and its main tasks were specified and

the sphere of as yet unsettled questions connected with the system of prospecting and extracting seabed resources was also delineated.

The main differences concern the question of whether all states have a guaranteed right of access to seabed resources and whether this body will be an instrument of cooperation and joint efforts of all states. The focus of the disagreements is concentrated on Article 22 Section 1 of the draft convention prepared by P. Engo (Cameroon), the chairman of the first committee. This provides a compromise solution to the question of access to the resources of the international region of the seabed and states the right of both the international body and of states to prospect and extract resources. It also discusses inseparably with these provisions key questions of the conditions for such activity and the forms of control over it on the part of an international organ.

The deadlock created at the last session was caused by some countries attempting to reject the compromise provisions of the draft convention and to dictate to the conference their own old version granting the right of access to seabed resources only to the international body. This line neutralized the results of the complex and laborious talks in the course of the third session in Geneva (1975) and the fourth session of the conference in New York (spring 1976).

Naturally, the Soviet Union, like a number of other countries, cannot support such a one-sided approach. As S. P. Kozyrev, head of the Soviet delegation, noted at the conference, the questions of a procedure for exploiting the resources of the seabed can be solved with the aid of a multilateral approach which would not exalt an organ or private companies but would take into account the interests of various social and economic systems. A mutually acceptable procedure must provide for the following basic provisions:

The right of the international body with respect to the seabed and the right of every state to prospect and extract seabed resources in accordance with the provisions of the convention. This will be a guarantee against discrimination vis-a-vis many countries, will safeguard the interests of all countries in the future and will place seabed regulations on a solid international foundation;

The inadmissibility of monopolizing the resources of the seabed for any states, private companies or international body or of inserting into the convention various systems for restricting access to those resources for any state or company.

On this basis agreement could also be reached on such central issues as providing the international body with the necessary material opportunities for exploiting seabed resources and it would also be possible to provide for its right to take necessary steps to avert adverse consequences from extracting minerals from the seabed for the economies of exporting countries--primarily the developing countries.

Other important issues are to be decided at the conference. Balanced consideration of the rights and interests of the various groups of states and rejection of the imposition of various unilateral decisions--such an approach would also permit the settlement of these issues. Attempts to apply any kind of pressure or to resort to unilateral annexation [zakhvaty] of various sections of the seabed would have the gravest adverse consequences. This journal and other Soviet publications have reported on the intentions and activities of U.S. private companies relating to the extraction of seabed resources and also on a corresponding bill in the U.S. Congress.* It must be emphasized in this connection that the commission of any kind of unilateral acts in respect of the international region of the seabed would be unlawful, would merely aggravate the atmosphere at the conference and would undermine the achievement of a mutually acceptable settlement not only of a procedure for the seabed but also of other basic questions of the law of the sea.

A Mutually Acceptable Settlement Is a Demand of the Time

The forthcoming session will also discuss other questions of the law of the sea on which a "consensus" (general agreement) of the overwhelming majority of states has not yet been reached. This applies in particular to such questions as the rules governing maritime scientific research and procedures for settling disputes over the interpretation and application of the future convention on the law of the sea.

It is clear from the result of the work of past sessions that this problem cannot be solved successfully without taking into account the position of the overwhelming majority of littoral states, primarily the developing countries, which are insisting that all research in the economic zone and on the continental shelf be carried out on the basis of consent. The developing countries are seeking the establishment of a procedure for scientific research which will provide assurance that maritime research near their shores will not pursue goals incompatible with the interests of science.

At a meeting of a group at the talks in the course of the New York fall 1976 talks it was stated on behalf of the Soviet delegation that if a majority of conference members considered it necessary to establish a system for conducting all kinds of maritime scientific research in the economic zone and on the continental shelf on the basis of consent, then the Soviet delegation would not object to such a system with the aim of achieving agreement as soon as possible on key questions of the law of the sea "in a package" and on the basis of a consensus.

It is hardly possible to share the opinion that establishing a system of conducting all kinds of maritime scientific research in the economic zone and on the continental shelf on the basis of consent would lead to the termination of such research in vast coastal maritime regions. It would seem necessary to proceed on the basis that the littoral developing countries will not refrain from conducting fundamental scientific research, since under the convention they will be sent research programs in advance, will be given the

* See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1976.

opportunity to send their scientists and trainees to the research vessels and will also be given help in assessing research results. It can be said with certainty that under such conditions not only will none of the littoral states set about putting obstacles in the way of scientific work, on the contrary, they will encourage it.

The same spirit of cooperation is characteristic of the Soviet Union's position on such an important and complex question as procedures for settling disputes over the interpretation and application of the convention. With regard for the elaboration of an acceptable "package" on basic questions of the law of the sea the Soviet delegation has supported the enshrining of provisions in the convention on the right of sovereign states to choose for themselves procedures for a binding settlement of disputes, particularly special arbitration procedures for settling specific disputes on shipping, fishing, pollution and others.

At the same time the Soviet delegation has directed well-founded criticism at attempts to impose on states the binding jurisdiction of a maritime law tribunal, the initiative for the creation of which was advanced earlier, as is known, by the U.S. delegation. The creation of such a tribunal as a common binding procedure on all states for the settling of disputes could create insuperable difficulties. This would be conducive not to settling disputes but to widening them and transforming them into dangerous conflict situations on the seas.

As the discussion at the conference showed, those provisions which envisage the referring of disputes on the delimitation of maritime regions between states to binding international settlement with the participation of a third party are unacceptable to many states, including the Soviet Union.

As a whole, despite a number of difficulties, real preconditions exist for successful progress and the completion of the conference's work. The entire range of questions on a procedure for the world's oceans can be solved in a spirit of cooperation and rejection of unilateral claims. Positive processes in international life and the relaxation of tension are creating the conditions necessary for this.

The achievement of mutually acceptable decisions at the conference would play an important role in the development of these processes and would create a basis in international law for peace and cooperation between states on the expanses of the world's oceans. This requires efforts by all states to insure the successful conclusion of the Third UN LOS Conference and its adoption of a unified convention on the utilization and exploitation of the world's oceans.

It is important to prevent the further spreading of unilateral tendencies, which contradict the fundamental long-term interests of all countries and peoples, to annex and divide up maritime areas. Only a comprehensive solution of the basic problems of a procedure for the world's oceans taking into account the legitimate rights and interests of various states will insure the success of such a settlement.

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CSO: 1803

REPUBLICANS HEAL THE WOUNDS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 62-67

[Article by O. N. Anichkin]

[Text] After the passions of the long and intense campaign for the presidential seat in the White House had subsided, the defeated Republicans analyzed the reasons for their failure. The results of the analysis, as they themselves admit, are depressing. This party is now experiencing the most severe stage of a political, ideological and organizational crisis.

"According to professional politicians of the two major parties," wrote THE NEW YORK TIMES, "ever since the 1976 election the Republican Party has been fighting for survival. And what is more, it is close to collapse." As corroboration of this diagnosis, the newspaper stated that most of the Republican leaders on the national scale had either been defeated, discredited or grown too old, and none of them can hope for success in the future. It is possible that this is an exaggeration, but the results of the 1976 elections and their comparison to the results of past elections speak for themselves.

The Republican Party lost the White House and is continuing to lose seats in Congress. After the 1972 elections, the Republicans had 192 seats in the House of Representatives and 43 in the Senate; after the intermediary elections of 1974 these figures had decreased to 144 and 39. At present, the ratio in the House of Representatives is more than 2:1 in favor of the Democrats (292 Democrats and 143 Republicans); in the Senate the respective figures are 62 and 38. Only 12 of the 50 states have Republican governors and, with the exception of Illinois and Michigan, the states now headed by Republican governors are insignificant in terms of their size and political importance. The Republican Party's loss of its position among the voters is also attested to by the fact that they have lost many seats in the legislative assemblies of the states, even in states where their influence had been indisputable until recently. For example, this applies to the Midwest--from Ohio to Iowa. But the most important thing is that this tendency has spread to the largest states--New York and California--where the governors had been N. Rockefeller and R. Reagan until recently.

Statistics show that the Republicans have returned to their 1964 positions, when their candidate, Barry Goldwater, suffered a crushing defeat in the presidential elections. This is now being spoken of to emphasize the unfavorable position of the Republican Party, since this period was the worst in its postwar history.

There are two main reasons for the failure of the Republican Party: In the first place, the consequences of the Watergate scandal caused the Republicans to "steadily slide downhill," as THE NEW YORK TIMES put it and, in the second place, the intensified conservatism of this party has caused it harm. It is true that the Republican leaders were able to weaken the effect of Watergate on the voters to some degree during the campaign. In any case, their losses were not as great as they had been during the intermediary elections in 1974. Nonetheless, Watergate gave the Democrats, the Republicans' rivals, a trump card. It is no accident that one of J. Carter's main slogans was his promise to restore confidence in the presidency and to do away with corruption in the executive branch.

In recent years, the conservative wing of the Republican Party has become stronger. The party leadership has turned out to be inflexible and incapable of reacting to the rapidly changing mood in the nation. In this way, they have provided a reason for remembering the old adage that the Democrats are more sensitive to vital problems. The Republican leaders have been accused of turning into a narrow and isolated group, connected with big business and expressing its interests. "Not all Republicans are millionaires, but most millionaires are Republicans"--many people are now recalling this accusation which was made long ago to emphasize this party's immunity to political changes. At the beginning of the 1920's, 43 percent of the American voters called themselves Republicans, but now the figure has dropped to slightly more than 20 percent.

The shift toward conservatism was also indicated by the platform adopted by the Republican Party at its convention in Kansas City. In the section dealing with domestic policy, emphasis was laid on various ways of stimulating business and "free enterprise" as the main method of combating unemployment and inflation; besides this, there was complete opposition to any increase in expenditures for social needs. In the area of foreign policy, particularly relations with the Soviet Union, no mention was made of the need to develop detente, but the need to increase America's military strength and to achieve military supremacy was emphasized. All of this was accompanied by the old cliches about the alleged "Soviet menace." In other words, the platform signified an obvious step backward in comparison to the statements made by the Republican leaders during the election campaigns of 1972 and even 1974. In order to promote his own candidacy, G. Ford made concessions to the ultra-conservatives headed by R. Reagan.

In analyzing the position of the Republican Party soon after its defeat in the elections of 2 November, THE NEW YORK TIMES stated that, if Ford had conducted a somewhat "more progressive policy" during the last 2 years, he

would have been able to win the election. And "a somewhat more interesting and ingenuous moderate candidate" of this party would indisputably have had greater success than G. Ford. In other words, the reasons for the Republicans' failure did not only lie in the personality of their candidate, but also in their political course, which was too conservative for the general American voting public.

Statements by prominent figures who are now playing the leading role in the Republican Party indicate that a fierce struggle for leadership took place in the higher ranks of the party immediately after the elections. There was also greater dispute as to whether the organizational strength of the party or the renovation of its ideology should be given primary significance. This referred to the fundamental modification of old dogmas.

Naturally, this process was being promoted by certain influential figures who had taken an active part in the election campaign and are now hardly concealing their ambition to lead the party. According to tradition, the nominal leader of the Republicans is still ex-president G. Ford. Even before the transfer of power to the Democrats, his press secretary R. Nessen announced that G. Ford "unequivocally regards himself as the head of the party." As a defeated candidate, however, he is not likely to exert a strong influence on the party or to have any decisive effect on the outcome of the struggle within the party. This struggle became particularly intense--and various groups within the party became quite apparent--after Mary Louise Smith, chairperson of the National Committee, announced her resignation. At least three factions immediately joined the fight for this position, which is of particularly great significance at this time when the party does not have its own president and is not in power.

The first faction consisted of the supporters of R. Reagan, who had had some success in challenging President G. Ford during the primary elections. Judging by the behavior of Reagan himself and his associates, this most conservative wing believes that it has earned the right to lead the party.

The next most active faction is made up of the supporters of J. Connally, the former governor of Texas, who transferred from the Democratic Party to the Republican camp in 1973. In his public statements, he has said that he has no plans for becoming the chairman of the National Committee, but, in actuality, he himself and his closest associates have waged an energetic campaign for this post. Some have said that J. Connally believes that he earned the right to head the party as a reward for his assistance to G. Ford during the election campaign. His opponents point out the ineffectiveness of this assistance: Even in this former Democrat's own state, G. Ford suffered utter defeat.

In any case, both the first and the second groups represent varieties of conservatism in the Republican Party.

The third group can be regarded as the so-called moderates, who sometimes call themselves liberals. They do not have any real leader, and those who

once aspired to this role (as, for example, Senator C. Percy and former member of the cabinet E. Richardson) are at present remaining in the background. The major role of this group is to prevent the conservatives from establishing control, which would isolate the moderates even further from party leadership, and might possibly even remove them from the seat of power in the future.

Former president G. Ford is somewhat separate from this group and occupies the center of the conflict. To some degree, he is closer to the moderates, but, according to statements in the press, he opposes the creation of ideological watersheds and the division of the party into factions. He has stated that he is more concerned about the unity of the party and the "viability of the two-party system." G. Ford is evidently one of those who was better than others in sensing the prevailing mood in the party. In any case, his opinions coincided with the data of a poll conducted by the ASSOCIATED PRESS agency among 40 prominent Republicans. The poll showed that, in their opinion, the Republicans "will be more victorious if they return to their basic principles and begin to work in earnest than if party ideology undergoes a shift to the right."

In spite of this, a fight between the conservatives and the moderates began almost immediately after the election. One of R. Reagan's staunch supporters, Senator J. Helms from North Carolina, made frequent public statements to demand "the reorganization of the National Committee staff and the reassessment of everything connected with the failures of the last decade, including even the name of the party." He called upon conservatives "to regain control over the party machine, beginning with the post of National Committee chairman and ending with lower links" for the purpose of transforming the Republican Party into a "conservative movement or conservative party with a broad base." It is indicative that R. Reagan also said that the name of the party should be changed. For example, when he spoke to industrialists in Boston, he said: "I want to gain the support of the growing number of independent and disillusioned Democrats for a new Republican Party. If this will require that the name of the party be changed, I will do this as well."

The moderates are not remaining idle either. At the initiative of Governor W. Milliken of Michigan, a special meeting of the moderate Republicans was convened in Washington, at which, later reports revealed, a strategy was worked out to block Senator Helms and his followers. In addition to party functionaries, the meeting was attended by 15 senators and members of the House of Representatives.

In the middle of last December and the beginning of January, the "elders" of the Republican Party, G. Ford, R. Reagan, J. Connally and N. Rockefeller, met at the White House to choose their candidate for the post of National Committee chairman and to determine ways of making the party more active politically. G. Ford favored the revival of the coordinating committee, which at one time had determined all political doctrine for the purpose of

a more effective struggle against the Democrats. This committee was set up for the first time in 1965, soon after the catastrophic defeat in the presidential elections of 1964; it was chaired by veteran Republican R. Bliss. The committee was made up of B. Goldwater, R. Nixon, T. Dewey, E. Dirksen, G. Ford, N. Rockefeller, G. Romney, W. Scranton and M. Laird--in other words, all of the influential Republicans of that time. Many Republicans now favor the revival of this committee, perhaps for the reason that, soon after its formation, the Republicans were able to take significant positions away from the Democrats during the intermediary elections of 1966 and to regain the presidential seat in the White House 2 years later. Those who attended the meetings in the White House could not agree on a candidate for the post of National Committee chairman and the decision was passed on to the committee itself.

Journalists pointed out the fact that such prominent Republican leaders as N. Rockefeller and B. Goldwater, these old rivals who still have a considerable amount of influence with various groups in the party and in various regions of the nation, actually took no part in the discussion of party affairs. Even though the former attended the meetings in the White House, he did not make any statements and did not express any opinions. He announced his retirement from active political life within the Republican Party. Prior to this, he had been unceremoniously dismissed from the Republican Party organization in the state of New York, which had essentially been created and financed by him. B. Goldwater, who was not even invited to the meetings in the White House, irately announced that he was offended and would no longer take part in fund-raising activities for the Republican Party. And he had been an extremely successful fund raiser.

The election of the Republican National Committee chairman pleased neither G. Ford nor R. Reagan, whose proteges were not able to win the post. J. Baker, who had supervised the Ford campaign during the last stage and who had received the credit for bridging the gap between those who had voted for the two candidates, withdrew from the race prior to the vote, sensing that he would not be the first to cross the finish line. R. Richards, member of the National Committee and Reagan supporter, was defeated during the third ballot.

The victor was 46-year-old W. Brock, former senator from the state of Tennessee, who only spent one term in the higher chamber of Congress. W. Brock has the reputation of an excellent organizer and a master of the political campaign. He is considered to be a conservative, but not of the Reagan type. In any case, he energetically supported G. Ford during the last campaign.

After the election of the National Committee chairman, the process of nominating party leaders on the national level had virtually been completed. In addition to W. Brock, the ruling triumvirate was made up of H. Baker, new Republican minority leader in the Senate (also from the state of Tennessee), and J. Rhodes, Republican leader in the House of Representatives

(Arizona). It is interesting that all of the Republican leaders are southerners; this is a fairly rare occurrence in the life of the party.

G. Ford, nominal leader of the Republicans, and W. Brock, new National Committee chairman, have stressed the need for expanding the base of the party in their latest statements, while Mary Louise Smith had warned that, if this were to be done, the Republican Party could be faced by a catastrophe.

Soon after his election, W. Brock announced that he had a plan for expanding the political base of the Republicans, which called for the "reconstruction of the undermined bases of the party throughout the nation" by encouraging labor, ethnic minorities, retired individuals and youth to join the party. Brock reported that the Republican Party was prepared to spend around 1.7 million dollars on the training of special public relations experts to work in all 50 states. It would seem that most of the effort is to be concentrated on work among blacks, particularly in the South.

The last presidential elections proved the significance of the black vote: The blacks contributed greatly toward J. Carter's success; he was the victor in every southern state but Virginia. The Republicans have now set themselves the task of ensuring that 3 out of every 10 blacks vote for Republican candidates. For this purpose, they plan to nominate representatives of the black community to various posts on different levels within their party. This will be the main job of the public relations experts spoken of by W. Brock. He obviously knows what he is talking about, since his failure to gain the black vote was precisely the reason for his defeat in the last election. The right man has already been found for this job. This is Arthur Fletcher, a black member of the White House staff during the last administration. A. Fletcher announced his candidacy for National Committee chairman, but it soon became clear that he would not be successful in this attempt. Nonetheless, this was the first time a black had run for this post in the Republican Party--a gesture which was obviously intended to demonstrate the Republican leaders' intention to begin a new "southern strategy." In any case, it was reported that W. Brock had requested A. Fletcher to make a "vital contribution" to this matter.

W. Brock, the newly elected Republican National Committee chairman, has a fairly optimistic view of the prospects for recovering the party's political positions. His calculations, as he himself has admitted, are simple: It will be necessary to add the votes of "new recruits to the Republican Party from among disillusioned Democrats and non-white voters" to the 48 percent of the vote that was won by G. Ford in the November election; this will create a new majority coalition. Time will tell whether the Republican Party will be able to do this.

The Republicans are now being given the most varied advice from all sides on what they must do to regain power. "When the ruling party loses power, the first thing it must do is to attract attention and wait for the proper

moment," wrote J. Harsch in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. In his words, this moment will come when the ruling party "makes enough mistakes or when a disaster strikes the nation during its term in power."

Judging by all indications, the leaders of the Republican Party will ultimately put their trust in the workings of the tested mechanism of the American two-party system.

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CSO: 1803

NEW HOUSE AND SENATE LEADERS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 68-77

[Article on Senate by V. A. Savel'yev and article on House by Ye. M. Silayeva]

[Text] In the United States, the year of 1977 has not only been marked by the occupancy of the White House by a new master and the formation of a new administration. A "change of the guard" also took place on Capitol Hill, in both congressional chambers. In particular, the leadership of the Democratic and Republican factions underwent significant changes. The leaders of the party factions in Congress are extremely influential figures in the highest spheres of the U.S. Government; now that Congress has gained greater influence over the formation of domestic and foreign policy, a great deal will depend on these leaders.

The reports printed below are notes on the people who head both of these factions in the Capitol.

In the Senate

The power in the Senate is not distributed equally. Although there are 100 legislators in the Senate, this does not mean that each senator has a hundredth of the total power of the chamber. The proportions of political power are immeasurably more complex. The Senate is headed by a fairly limited "internal club," or establishment, where the most important position is occupied by representatives of the official party hierarchy from the Democratic and Republican factions and their assistants (the so-called "whips"). Their power is stable: A change of leaders is quite rare. For example, Senator M. Mansfield was the Democratic leader from 1961 until 1977 and H. Scott headed the Republican faction from 1969 on.

The leader of the majority faction (at present the Democratic faction) is, in general, the most influential man in the Senate, since he simultaneously heads such party organizations of the Democrats in the Senate as their

caucus (conference) and the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. He sees to the planning of faction activities and the collection and distribution of information on the status of various bills, the procedures for passing them and the positions of concerned individuals and organizations. In addition to this, he is responsible for influencing the vote of the senators and maintaining contacts with the White House.

In January 1977, Senator Robert Byrd from West Virginia was elected the Democratic majority leader. He was born in 1918 in North Wilkesboro (North Carolina) and is a Baptist. He began his working career and completed his studies while working as an unskilled laborer. West Virginia is one of the most conservative states and still has strong racist traditions. These traditions have left their mark on the senator's biography. Immediately prior to World War II and during the war, he was one of the staunch supporters of racial segregation and, until 1945, he was even a Ku Klux Klan organizer in this state. Incidentally, the senator now prefers to not talk about this.

Byrd began his political career in the mid-1940's. He was elected to the legislative assembly of West Virginia (in 1946-1950 he was a member of the House of Representatives and, in 1950-1952, he was a state senator). After establishing connections with influential businessmen and politicians, Byrd progressed--to the federal capital. From 1953 through 1959, he held a seat in the House of Representatives and, in 1959, he was elected the U.S. senator from West Virginia. Byrd's position in his native state is now so strong that, for example, no Republican dared to challenge him in the 1976 election.

Byrd is a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Rules and Administration.¹

This politician first attracted the attention of all Americans in 1971, when he unexpectedly, according to the press, defeated E. Kennedy in the fight for the post of the assistant majority leader. But as later events showed, the victory of the senator from West Virginia was not so much a matter of chance: His ascent in the community of Democratic senators was carefully planned and pleased many. And his present success is also connected with the alignment of forces in the Capitol. THE NEW YORK TIMES reported that, in electing the new leader, the Democrats had rejected the "charming" Hubert Humphrey² and had preferred the more "sober" Robert Byrd; the press also pointed out the fact that Senator Byrd's industrious nature and his willingness to always do favors for his Democratic colleagues attracted not only conservatives and those in the middle of the road over to his side, but also many liberals, which, in the final analysis, predetermined the outcome of this race for leadership. But it is interesting that, during a period when the Democratic faction in the Senate is tending to become more liberal, its leader is now a man who began his career as a staunch conservative and only took a more moderate position at the beginning of the 1970's; it is obvious that he is supposed to balance the forces of the different groups in the Democratic faction. Byrd is frequently called a skillful organizer and was able to distinguish himself during the Watergate investigation.³

Byrd has always voted against civil rights bills. And although his views on several matters have changed somewhat in recent years, he still opposes busing--the transport of schoolchildren by bus for the purpose of overcoming segregation in the sphere of education. Byrd usually supports proposals on increased military expenditures, as was the case in 1975-1976, but he did approve of the idea of reducing the size of American troops stationed overseas--possibly because of a sense of loyalty to its author, Mansfield. This, incidentally, has not stopped him from supporting an increase in American military undertakings: He approved the installation of a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, the testing of MaRV systems⁴ and the development of the B-1 bomber. Byrd is not devoid of a certain degree of realism in his attitude toward foreign policy. While in the 1960's Byrd was one of the few senators who opposed the ratification of the treaty banning nuclear tests in the three spheres, in 1972 he unconditionally approved of the treaty to limit antimissile defense systems, pointing out the fact that new realities must be taken into consideration. According to Byrd, the United States, for example, should normalize its relations with Cuba.

In the field of Soviet-American relations, Byrd's position is also inconsistent, although he most frequently leans to the right. For example, in 1971 he was in favor of repealing several of the restrictions on trade between the United States and the socialist countries, but in 1974 he voted in favor of the provocative Jackson-Vanek Amendment and in favor of the limit of 300 million dollars on credit extended to the Soviet Union by the Export-Import Bank. In 1972, Byrd supported Jackson's militaristic amendment on the activation of American military efforts to the resolution approving the provisional agreement on strategic arms limitation and opposed the more or less realistic amendments of Fulbright and Muskie on the need for negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis of the principles of "total equality" and "parity" of strategic forces. He voted in favor of the protocol to the treaty of 1972 on the limitation of antimissile defense systems.

On 4 January 1977, Byrd addressed the senators, calling for improved relations with mainland China "without any deterioration in our friendly ties with Taiwan"; he insisted on the strengthening of political, economic and military relations with the Western European countries and Japan.

Even before J. Carter's inauguration, newsmen in the United States predicted that the Democratic leader in the Senate and the President would work together on virtually all matters with one possible exception: The senator from West Virginia has never supported reform of the social security system and the antipoverty program. They therefore felt that differences of opinion might arise in this area. By the end of January 1977, however, according to reports in THE NEW YORK TIMES, the first signs of tension were seen in the relations between the White House and the Democratic leader in the Senate; The latter himself said that, although the "honeymoon" between J. Carter and Congress would continue for at least 8 years, "some fairly serious tiffs might also arise."

The second level in the party hierarchy belongs to the assistant faction leader. His formal duties include ensuring the maximum presence of members of his faction at meetings of the Senate by means of memos, telephone calls and telegrams; in emergencies, he even reserves airplane seats for legislators who are visiting their constituents at home, calling them to Washington for an important ballot. He surveys the members of his faction to learn their positions on coming ballots, which permits him to plan the strategy and tactics to be used in the fight for the passage of a bill. But his most important job probably consists in his use of various means to exert influence on the representatives of his faction who are planning to vote against the party leaders or who are simply undecided. It is with good reason that, in political terminology, he has been given the title of the "whip."

The post of the assistant leader of the party faction automatically advances the senator occupying this post to the rank of the elected "masters" of the chamber. We cannot forget that, traditionally, this post has represented the last step before the occupancy of the position of faction leader in the Senate. At different times, it served as a trampoline for Democrats L. Johnson, M. Mansfield and R. Byrd and Republicans E. Dirksen and H. Scott.

Alan Cranston, the senator from California and one of the most liberal of the Democrats, was elected to this position. He was born in 1914 in Palo Alto and is a Protestant. He attended Pomona College and graduated from Stanford University in 1936 with a bachelor of arts degree. During 1936-1938, he worked as an INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE correspondent in England, Italy, Germany and Ethiopia and then served as a lobbyist for 1 year. During World War II, he served in the army. He dealt in real estate after his discharge.

During 1958-1966, Cranston was controller of the state of California and, in 1968, he was elected senator from California for the first time, after winning a fairly difficult victory (53 percent of the vote) over conservative Republican M. Rafferty.

Cranston began his political career as the founder of the so-called California Democratic Council--a group which is regarded in this state as the liberal wing of the local Democratic organization. In the Capitol, however, the new liberal senator demonstrated an extraordinary ability to maintain friendly relations with conservatives and to serve as an "engineer of compromises." In recent years, there has only been one noticeable exception to his ordinarily liberal position: This was his vote in 1974 in favor of the extension of 250 million dollars in credit to Lockheed, one of the largest firms in California. Cranston is in favor of busing and the reduction of American troops overseas and is against increased military expenditures. The liberal organization, Americans for Democratic Action, never evaluated his balloting procedures below 89 percent in 1972-1975, while the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action never gave him a rating of more than 11 percent.

As for Soviet-American relations, Cranston occupies an extremely realistic position on this matter: He supported the treaty on the limitation of

antimissile defense systems and the protocol to this treaty; when the resolution on the results of the first stage of the strategic arms limitation talks was being discussed, he voted against the Jackson Amendment and in favor of all three variants of the more realistic amendments of Fulbright, Symington and Muskie; he opposed the development of the MIRV and MaRV systems, and, in 1976, favored the reduction of the defense budget from 113 billion dollars to 110 billion, although he also favored the construction of the B-1 bomber. Finally, Cranston was one of the initiators of the resolution adopted by the Senate to promote the rapid conclusion of the second stage of the SALT talks and a 20-percent reduction in strategic arms levels during the third stage of these talks. He harshly criticized the adventurist strategy of "counterforce" and "limited nuclear warfare" suggested by J. Schlesinger. Cranston was also one of those opposing the testing of the MaRV system and the construction of the base on Diego Garcia. At the same time, although Cranston favored the elimination of discriminatory restrictions on trade with the USSR in 1971, by 1974 he had changed his views and voted, along with the majority of the liberals, in favor of the Jackson-Vanek Amendment, which was directed against the socialist nations, and the Stevenson Amendment on the establishment of a credit limit for the Soviet Union; these amendments were received by the public as a revival of the cold war policy.

In the 1974 election, Cranston won the greatest majority of the last 60 years in California: He received 63 percent of the vote, or 1.5 million more votes than Republican H. Richardson; Cranston spent 1,336,000 dollars on his campaign, which exceeded his opponent's expenses by 634,000 dollars.

The California senator is a member of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the Budget Committee, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

The Republican leadership in the Senate has traditionally been less centralized than the Democratic. In particular, intrafaction committees (on policy and appointments) are not headed by the leader of the Republicans, as in the case of their Democratic opponents, but by other senators. The minority faction uses the Committee on Policy for the precise elaboration of its position on political and legislative matters, while for the Democrats, this committee is only an advisory organ which the majority leader might choose not to consult. On the other hand, as a result of the loss of the White House by this party, the Republican faction leader in the Senate is becoming one of the recognized leaders of the party on the nationwide scale.

Howard Baker, conservative from Tennessee, was elected the Republican minority leader. He was born in 1925 in Huntsville and is a Presbyterian. He studied at Tulane University in New Orleans and at universities in the state of Tennessee. He has a law degree and is a partner in the Baker, Worthington, Barnett and Crossley Law Firm (Knoxville, Tennessee). During 1943-1946, he served in the U.S. Navy. His father and stepmother were members of the House of Representatives and, in addition to this, he is the son-in-law of the late Republican leader in the Senate, E. Dirksen, so that the field of politics is

the family business, so to speak, for Baker. Baker has been in the Senate since January 1967. He won this election by means of careful campaign tactics, which allowed him to project the image of an objective and sensible man of moderately conservative leanings. He is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

During the Nixon years, Baker supported the administration in most matters. After the death of his father-in-law, Dirksen, in 1969, the senator from Tennessee was defeated by Hugh Scott in the struggle for the post of leader, but he has not wasted the last few years. Baker acquired nationwide fame at the Watergate hearings. As an influential member of the Select Committee on Campaign Practices and Watergate, a photogenic senator and a talented speaker, he was able to project the image, according to millions of television viewers, of an "objective" legislator, for whom the truth is more important than loyalty to the leader of his party, but who understands the "human weaknesses" to which the President fell prey.

Baker is regarded as a possible candidate for the presidency or vice presidency in the future, particularly since he does not foresee any difficulties in retaining his seat during the 1978 election for the Senate: In 1972, he won a fairly strong majority of 62 percent. Although many conservatives have suspected Baker of "latent liberalism" ever since the Watergate scandal and the resignation of President Nixon, his position in Senate ballots hardly provides any grounds for this kind of assumption. Baker favors increased military expenditures and the continuation of military aid to foreign states and is against the reduction of American troops overseas and the refusal to allocate funds for the construction of a naval base on Diego Garcia. He has also objected to busing, the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, etc.

In matters concerning Soviet-American relations, this man is the most conservative of the new leaders of both factions: He voted for the Jackson Amendment to the provisional agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and against all amendments changing its meaning; he supported the treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems, but voted against the protocol to this treaty; he favored the active development of the MIRV and MaRV systems and the construction of atomic submarines and approved of the Trident program and the plans to develop the B-1 bomber; in 1976, he voted against the proposal on the reduction of the defense budget to 110 billion dollars; finally, he supported all anti-Soviet amendments to the 1974 acts on trade reform and on the extension of the powers of the Export-Import Bank.

The assistant leader of the Republican faction in the Senate in the 95th Congress is Senator Theodore Stevens (Alaska), who was born in 1923 in Indianapolis. He is a member of the Episcopalian Church. He studied at universities in Oregon and Montana. During World War II, he served in the Air Force. In 1950, he graduated from Harvard University with a law degree. During 1950-1953, Stevens worked for various law firms and, during 1953-1956,

he worked as an attorney and then as a legislative counsel to the Department of the Interior and an assistant to the secretary of the department, after which he again returned to his law firm; during 1964-1968, he was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives.

After being elected to the U.S. Senate from the same state in 1968, Stevens frequently voted (until 1975) against the allocation of funds for new defense programs; he favored the withdrawal of some American troops stationed overseas, as a result of negotiations, but not in a onesided manner. He also opposed the renewal of military aid to Turkey. Stevens was regarded as an independent senator who was closely connected neither with the liberal nor the conservative wing of the faction, but more likely to be closer to the former. In recent years, however, the position of this legislator began to change perceptibly, particularly in regard to international detente and Soviet-American relations. In 1972, he supported the treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems and then voted in favor of the protocol to this treaty in 1975. On the other hand, he voted for the militaristic Jackson Amendment mentioned above in regard to the provisional agreement of 1972 on strategic arms limitation, supported the administration's measures to actively increase the military and political potential of the United States and voted for all anti-Soviet amendments to the trade legislation of 1974, even though he had favored the expansion of trade with the socialist countries earlier, in 1971.

The change of leaders in the Senate, as has already been mentioned, is not a frequent event, particularly the kind of drastic change that has recently taken place, leaving none of the previous leaders, with the exception of Byrd, who has risen to a higher level. It is interesting that R. Griffin, Capitol veteran, who was considered to be the main contender for the post of the minority leader, was not even able to gain the position of the minority whip. This reflected the American people's desire for changes in Washington, which had to be taken into consideration by the legislators.

The question naturally arises as to the degree to which the new leaders of the Senate factions differ from the previous leaders in terms of their political sympathies, style of work, etc. American observers have stressed the fact that Byrd is somewhat more conservative than Mansfield, while Cranston, in turn, is more liberal than Byrd. For this reason, the new Democratic leaders are regarded as a whole as being "slightly more conservative" than the previous leaders; but since one of the new Republicans is a middle-of-the-road politician, who has replaced a purely conservative senator, the leadership should be somewhat more moderate and so forth. These kinds of assumptions, however, despite all of their apparent simplicity and cogency, are nothing more than assumptions. The new and more active role of Congress in the determination and implementation of American foreign and domestic policy is more important. This is why the main conclusion to be drawn from the rearrangement of the Senate does not consist in formal characteristics, whether these concern the slightly younger age group of the leaders or other such features, but in the fact that the new leaders represent a generation

of politicians who are insisting that the powers of Congress be more extensive. Judging by all of this, these new leaders are not likely to give up the powers acquired by the Capitol in recent years.

In the House of Representatives

The complete change of leadership in the Democratic majority of the House of Representatives has evoked considerable interest in political circles and in the American press: There is a new speaker, majority leader, assistant leader--or party organizer--and chairman of the general Democratic conference.¹

The new speaker of the House of Representatives of the 95th Congress, Thomas O'Neill, was born in 1912 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His grandfather, an Irish stonemason, emigrated to the United States. O'Neill became interested in politics early in his life: At 15, he was one of A. Smith's campaign workers and, at 22, he himself ran (unsuccessfully) for the Cambridge municipal council. By the time he was 24 he had been elected to the Massachusetts legislative assembly and, in time, became the leader of the Democratic faction in the assembly and then the speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

In 1952, O'Neill was elected to the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. He ran for a district which had been represented earlier by J. Kennedy. There were 36 higher academic institutions in the district, including Harvard and Boston universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Students accounted for 15 percent of the total population of the district; around 41 percent of the population consisted of ethnic minorities. This population mixture had a substantial effect on O'Neill's attitude toward L. Johnson's policy in Southeast Asia. In 1967, he was one of the first Democratic congressmen to condemn the war in Vietnam. O'Neill acquired a position of strength in the district: In 1974, he won 88 percent of the vote.

In the House of Representatives, O'Neill is regarded as a liberal congressman. In 1974, his voting procedures were evaluated 75-percent liberal by the reformist organization of Americans for Democratic Action; the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action feels that only 8 percent of his positions have been conservative. In particular, O'Neill has voted for busing--the transport of schoolchildren by bus for the purpose of obtaining a racial balance in the system of elementary education. O'Neill's position on Watergate was characteristic: He favored impeachment, stressing the fact that this was the only "responsible approach."

O'Neill favors the reduction of defense expenditures. He supported the amendment on the reduction of the defense budget for the 1977 fiscal year by 2 billion dollars and voted against the allocation of additional funds for the development of antimissile defense and MaRV systems. At the same time, the position of the new speaker is not always consistent in this area. For example, in 1974 O'Neill voted for the development of the B-1 bomber.

This, in particular, affected the evaluation of his performance by the pro-militaristic American Security Council, which approved of O'Neill's general position by a vote of 60 percent.

O'Neill's foreign policy views are typical for a liberal Democrat. In 1974, he voted for an embargo on military aid to Turkey in connection with the events on Cyprus and for an amendment to limit American activity in Angola. O'Neill also voted for the approval of the provisional agreement on strategic arms limitation, which was concluded by the USSR and the United States in 1972.

As a member of the Rules Committee, O'Neill has acquired knowledge in the area of complex procedural matters and experience in political maneuvering. He was also the second oldest member of the influential Appropriations Committee. But his promotion to the leadership of the Democratic faction was even more rapid than his career in the committees. From the very beginning of his activities in the House, he was the protege of Speaker McCormack, who aided O'Neill in gaining a position on the Rules Committee; his other patron was H. Boggs, who was elected to the post of Democratic majority leader in 1971. H. Boggs appointed O'Neill as his assistant, and a year after Boggs' death in an airline disaster, T. O'Neill was elected majority leader. Finally, in 1977 he became the speaker of the House of the U.S. Congress.

The new leader of the Democratic faction of the House is James Wright from the state of Texas. He was born in 1922 in Fort Worth (Texas) and graduated from the University of Texas. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Air Force. After the war, Wright became a partner in an advertising firm. The stages of his political career included terms as a member of the Texas legislative assembly, mayor of the city of Weatherford and president of the League of Texas Municipalities.

In 1954, Wright was elected to the House of Representatives from the 12th district of the state of Texas--a district with a developed economy, which distinguished Wright among the conservative Texas congressmen who mainly represented the rural heartland. The congressmen from Texas usually take a racist stand and defend the interests of the large oil monopolies. Wright, however, took a liberal stand on civil rights and, in contrast to most Texas congressmen, was not connected with "big oil" interests; he is backed up by other forces, as we will see later. In particular, he feels that the oil depletion allowance should apply only to small companies and individuals in this field.

The ideological views of J. Wright have been given contradictory evaluations. Sometimes he is called a moderate. On several matters (such as social policy, civil rights and role of government in the economy), he definitely tends toward liberalism, but his position on several foreign policy matters (for example, his attitude toward defense expenditures) and on the problem of environmental protection is strictly conservative. For example, he supported the war in Vietnam even when most of the Democrats were opposed to

it and was the author of a resolution in 1969 which praised Nixon's policy in Southeast Asia; at the same time, in 1975 he voted against military aid to counterrevolutionary forces in Angola and for an embargo on military aid to Turkey in connection with the events on Cyprus.

Wright's position on foreign policy matters and his attitude toward defense expenditures are conditioned by the fact that his district contains the main enterprises of the General Dynamics Company, one of the Pentagon's largest suppliers. Wright's activities and voting performance on matters connected with defense expenditures have been 100-percent approved by the American Security Council. In particular, Wright voted for increased appropriations for antimissile defense systems, the development of the B-1 bomber and the MaRV and voted against all amendments envisaging reduction in the defense budget for the 1977 fiscal year.

Wright was a member of the Democratic Policy Committee, where he showed himself to be a politician who was capable of maneuvering and a master of compromise. Despite the fact that Wright is fairly well known in the House, his election to the post of majority leader was unexpected: In comparison to such strong contenders as P. Burton, R. Bolling and J. McFall, he had relatively little chance of winning and was a "dark horse" in the race. During the balloting, Wright was unanimously supported by the southern congressmen, for whom his election symbolized the return of southern representatives to the leadership of the Democratic faction. Wright himself feels that his candidacy balanced the differences in the ideological views of the faction leaders: The speaker, organizer and caucus chairman (chairman of the general conference) are liberals, while Wright represents the moderately conservative wing.

The new assistant leader (he is the organizer, or "whip") of the Democratic faction, John Brademas, was born in March 1927 in Mishawaka, Indiana. His ancestors emigrated to the United States from Greece. He graduated from Harvard and Oxford universities and received a bachelor of arts degree. During World War II, he served in the navy. After the war, Brademas was an assistant professor at St. Mary's College. During the first stages of his political career, he was an administrative assistant of Congressman T. Ashley and the executive assistant of Senator A. Stevenson III.

In 1958, Brademas became a congressman himself and has achieved some success as a legislator. He is a member of the Committee on Education and Labor and the chairman of the Select Education Subcommittee. In the Capitol, Brademas is regarded as a prominent specialist on higher education and has been the author of several bills in this area. The liberals support Brademas' voting performance by 100 percent, while the conservatives evaluate his performance at zero.

Brademas definitely supports the reduction of defense expenditures. He voted against the antimissile defense and MaRV systems and the B-1 bomber, he favored the reduction of defense appropriations for the 1977 fiscal year, he opposed American intervention in Angola and voted for congressional control

over foreign deliveries of U.S. weapons. In 1974, Brademas headed the group of Greek-American congressmen who were trying to put an embargo on military aid to Turkey in connection with the events on Cyprus; the amendment on the curtailment of military deliveries to Turkey was adopted in spite of the objections of Secretary of State H. Kissinger. Prior to his appointment as faction organizer, Brademas was the assistant organizer and proved to be an efficient leader.

There was much less change in the leadership of the Republican faction and, on the whole, this leadership retained its previous conservative outlines.

Here is a description of the present faction leaders. The Republican leader, John Rhodes (from Arizona), was born in 1916 in Council Grove, Kansas. He graduated from Kansas State University and continued his education at Harvard, where he was awarded a law degree. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Air Force. After the war, he had a private law practice and was vice president of the Farm and Home Life Insurance Company.

Since 1952, Rhodes has represented the first district of the state of Arizona in the U.S. Congress. The Republican Party has a strong position in this district, conservative views are widespread and the supporters of Senator B. Goldwater, including Rhodes himself, have a great deal of influence there. In 1952, when B. Goldwater was first elected to the Senate, Rhodes also won a victory in this district. Now the boundaries of the district have been changed and the population includes blacks, Spanish-Americans and students. In 1974, Rhodes was re-elected, but he only received 51 percent of the vote.

For all these years, Rhodes has occupied a conservative position in the House. He supports a high level of defense expenditures and the development of new types of weapons; in particular, he voted for the allocation of additional funds for the development of the antimissile defense and MaRV systems and the B-1 bomber and against amendments on the reduction of the 1977 defense budget.

As the second oldest member of the influential Appropriations Committee and the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee in the House of Representatives, Rhodes became G. Ford's successor in 1974 and occupied the post of minority leader.

According to several political correspondents, this politician is a stern leader: During the Ford Administration, he gave maximum support to the President and worked on each member of his faction for this purpose. During the "war of the veto" between the President and the Democratic majority, the Republicans did everything possible to prevent the Democrats from gaining the two-thirds necessary for overriding the President's veto. Rhodes has won the reputation of a legislator with a great deal of experience in political maneuvering; people feel that he takes a conservative stand not so much for ideological reasons as for pragmatic reasons; his efforts to retain a general conservative orientation within the faction and to isolate it from the influence of the liberal Democrats have been quite noticeable.

Rhodes' foreign policy position is typical for a conservative Republican. In 1974, he voted against the embargo on military aid to Turkey, against the limitation of U.S. activity in Angola, against the establishment of congressional control over foreign deliveries of American weapons, etc.

The assistant leader of the Republican faction, R. Michel, was born in 1923 in Peoria, Illinois. He graduated from Bradley University and fought in World War II. From 1949 through 1956 he was Congressman H. Velde's administrative assistant.

Since 1956, that is, for more than 20 years now, R. Michel has represented the 18th district in Illinois. He is a member of the influential Appropriations Committee and the senior member of the Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare Subcommittee. Michel favors the reduction of social programs and is opposed to busing. On matters of domestic and foreign policy, he takes a conservative stand, which is characteristic of most Republicans. In 1974, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action approved of 11 percent of his voting performance, while the extremely conservative Americans for Constitutional Action gave him a 94-percent rating of approval. Michel supports a high level of defense expenditures. In 1972, the militaristic American Security Council approved his activities by 100 percent. He voted for the allocation of additional funds for the development of the antimissile defense system and the B-1 bomber and against the embargo on military aid to Turkey.

John Anderson was re-elected chairman of the Republican Conference. He was born in 1922 in Rockford, Illinois, graduated from the University of Illinois with a bachelor's degree and continued his studies at Harvard, where he received a law degree. He fought in World War II. After the war, he had a private law practice. From 1956-1960 he was a judge in Winnebago County and, since 1960, he has represented the 16th district of Illinois in Congress.

Anderson is famous as a conservative of moderate leanings. In general, his views correspond to the traditional Republican credo. He completely supports the economic platform of his party, criticizes the overgrown bureaucratic machine of the federal government and is working toward its reduction; just as most Republicans, he opposes the reduction of the defense budget. It is with good reason that his activities have received a high evaluation (90 percent) from the American Security Council.

At the same time, Anderson's views do not always correspond completely to those of the extreme conservatives in his faction. An example of this may be found in his independent position on the Watergate affair. This even caused friction between Anderson and the pro-Nixon group in the Republican faction, and it was later quite difficult for him to retain the post of the chairman of the Republican Conference. After Nixon's resignation and the defeat suffered by the Republicans in the 1974 elections, however, Anderson's position grew stronger.

Anderson has also occupied a unique stand on the government financing of congressional elections. Along with the liberal Democrat M. Udall, he favored the payment of federal grants to those candidates who had independently collected certain amounts of funds through small contributions. He also voted in favor of busing. His foreign policy position is also somewhat different from typical Republican views and combines support for a high level of defense expenditures and the development of new types of weapons with condemnation of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Southeast Asia and other regions.

Anderson is the second oldest member of the influential Rules Committee and an honorary member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

These are the "service records" of the new leaders of both factions in the House of Representatives on Capitol Hill.

FOOTNOTES

In the Senate

1. In connection with the present reorganization of the committee system in the Senate, there is a possibility that changes will be made in their membership.
2. In accordance with the Constitution, the vice-president occupies the position of the president of the Senate, but this part is actually played by the president pro tempore. He is the senior senator of the majority faction. Because of H. Humphrey's "special services" (his 20 years in the Senate and his term as vice-president in 1965-1969), on 10 January 1977 Congress approved a proposal which established a special post for him--the assistant president pro tempore of the Senate.
3. It was precisely Byrd's persistence which caused the select Senate committee on the investigation of violations of the law during the election campaign of 1972 to question J. Dean, Nixon's legal adviser. Dean testified that the illegal break-in of Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate building in 1972 was planned and carried out on the orders of President Nixon's closest assistants, particularly his campaign manager, Mitchell, former attorney general. Besides this, Dean admitted that President Nixon had issued specific instructions on "covering up" the Watergate affair so that it would not hurt his chances for re-election. Dean's testimony to the Senate committee forced other persons involved in the conspiracy to talk and, ultimately, led to Nixon's resignation. Incidentally, Byrd was not the only one whose career was furthered by the Watergate investigation; it also helped many other politicians to gain political capital, particularly within the Capitol. During the time when anti-Washington feeling was growing in the nation, the struggle "for the purity of political morals," which is the way in which the

legislators who opposed Nixon now describe their position, became the most reliable way of retaining their seats in Congress and of creating favorable conditions for a successful career in the future.

4. MaRV--maneuverable head on a missile with separate guidance of warheads to a target (abbreviation for maneuverable re-entry vehicles).

In the House of Representatives

1. Prior to this, several important posts in the House had transferred to other hands for specific reasons. Congressman W. Mills had to refuse the post of chairman of the Ways and Means Committee after the police arrested him for drunk driving while he was in the company of a strip-tease artist; as a result of this, it became public knowledge that the congressman was an alcoholic. One congressional staff member confessed that, while she had been employed as a secretary to the chairman of the House Administration Committee, W. Hays, she had received a salary simply for being his mistress; Congressman A. Howe was arrested for soliciting the services of a prostitute who turned out to be an undercover police-woman. If we add the discovered incidents of corruption among legislators, the bribes they have taken from various monopolies and foreign governments and the different ways in which some legislators misuse their authority, we can understand why many congressmen have become the target of harsh criticism from the public.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FAITHFUL SERVITORS OF REACTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 78-79

[Review by G. D. Gevorgyan of the book "'Social-Democrats -- USA' in the Service of Reaction: A Record of Racism, Low Wages, Bureaucracy and Betrayal of Socialism" by George Morris, New Outlook Publishers, 1976, 62 pages]

[Text] In their struggle against detente, the reactionary leaders of the AFL-CIO have been making extensive use of an organization created in 1972 under the name of Social-Democrats USA (SD USA).

The noted American researcher George Morris now describes in the brochure under review the cooperation of the rightist social-democrats with the labor union bureaucrats of the AFL-CIO. For more than 40 years, the author has been describing, in the communist press, the problems of the workers and of the labor union movement in the United States. He is the author of a number of books and brochures dealing with the struggle of the working class for its vital interests and exposing the connivance of labor union bureaucrats with the reactionary forces of imperialism.

During World War I, writes Morris, the head of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, was bitterly opposed to any cooperation between the labor unions and the socialists. However, even then, Gompers and his supporters in the labor unions had interests in common with the rightist socialist party, which had supported America's entry into the imperialist war, favored racism and class cooperation, and supported the struggle of labor union bureaucrats against the movement of the rank-and-file working men.

Collaboration between the rightist socialist party and the upper level bureaucrats of the AFL became especially close after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They were united in their feeling of anti-communism and their hatred for the socialist state. The rightist social-democrats, indicates Morris, were especially useful (to the leaders of the AFL) because they could use their reputation as "socialists" to engage in propaganda against the Soviet state.

Of late, notes Morris, the strength of the anti-communist argument has weakened in the U.S. Nevertheless, the extreme right-wing socialists continue to be the most irreconcilable opponents of the progressive forces.

The political degradation of the rightist socialists, writes Morris, is expressed, first of all, in their racist ideology. The author cites data indicating that rightist American socialists had supported racist positions even before World War I, in the belief that "Negroes and other minorities undoubtedly represent an inferior race." Racism remains, to this day, the basis of their ideology. The most militant supporter of this ideology is the leader of the SD USA, Albert Shanker.

The author reminds his readers that rightist socialists welcomed the American intervention against the young Soviet state and supported the anti-Soviet activity of Gompers. Every time America found itself in the throes of yet another wave of anti-Soviet hysteria, writes Morris, the rightist socialists were exultant. Just as they were very happy when Hitler's Germany invaded Soviet territory in June 1941.

After World War II, states Morris, they actively cooperated with the CIA in conducting anti-communist sabotage operations within the international labor unions and the workers movement in general.

At the same time, the rightist social democrats continue to ignore the socioeconomic needs of the working class. Members of labor unions directed by the rightist social-democrats earn the lowest wages, the most miserable pensions, and work under extremely difficult conditions.

The present phase in the expansion of cooperation between the rightist social-democrats and the reactionary top level of the AFL-CIO came into being following the merger, in 1972, of the extremely reactionary Social-Democratic Federation and the Socialist Party. Members of this newly created organization, called Social-Democrats, USA, placed themselves entirely at the service of George Meany's group, providing it with cadres for the AFL-CIO apparatus as well as for the organs of the labor-union press, the leading posts in individual labor unions, and in organs of the Democratic Party.

The principal objective of the SD USA organization, points out Morris, consists of a struggle with the world of socialism. This course of action by the rightist social-democrats was developed, according to Morris, by the renegades expelled from the Communist Party at the end of the 1920's. It is precisely among this trash that the reactionaries of all types recruited the "theoreticians," informers, provocateurs and dissenters in the labor movement.

One of the reasons for the increased influence of the SD USA within the AFL-CIO, according to Morris, is the pensioning off of a number of labor union leaders, including those of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, who moderately supported the idea of peace. The retiring leaders were replaced by members of the SD USA -- Murray H. Finlay and Jacob Sheinkman.

The post of chairman of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union was also held by a man of reactionary and aggressive views, Sol C. Chaikin, who is a member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO. Heading the Union of Textile Workers is Sol Stetin who, for many years, was a rightist socialist and who recently became a member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO.

A violent racist, anti-Sovietist and anti-communist, Albert Shanker, became head of the American Federation of Teachers and a member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO. In fact, he has become the principal representative of the SD USA on that council.

Morris emphasizes that today George Meany needs, more than ever, the participation of the SD USA on the executive council of the AFL-CIO. Above all, he needs their support for his foreign policy course. This is due to the fact that, in the international labor movement, there has arisen some discontent over the efforts of American labor union bureaucrats to subordinate foreign labor unions to the interests of American imperialism. Millions of workers in various countries now realize the need for a joint struggle against their exploiters and, especially, against the multinational corporations. They reject the policy of anti-communism and support the goals of strengthening peace and relaxing international tensions. Meany needs the support of rightist socialists, explains Morris, in order to lend "respectability" to members of the executive council of the AFL-CIO, because their foreign policy is in conflict with the policy of the social-democrats in other capitalist countries and they find themselves isolated from the mainstream of the international labor union and workers movement.

Moreover, as Morris points out, the leaders of the AFL-CIO, in recent years, forfeited the backing of broad sections of American society because of their support for the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and their pursuit of a racist and reactionary course in domestic policy. The Meany group hopes that the rightist social-democrats, with their demagoguery, would be able to attract the support of American liberals for the reactionary labor union bureaucrats, from whom the liberals have been long estranged. With the aid of rightist socialists, the Meany group seeks to restore in the labor unions the atmosphere of the "cold war."

The brochure points out that today members of the SD USA hold positions of "ideological" and "political" importance in the AFL-CIO. Morris describes in detail the current reactionary anti-Soviet and anti-communist activity of the SD USA within the bureaucratic apparatus of the AFL-CIO, as well as in its international and propaganda organs and in individual unions belonging to the organization.

This brochure by George Morris is an important document, revealing the reactionary role and activity of rightist American social-democrats who seek to obstruct the struggle of the American working class against the offensive launched by state-monopoly capitalism against the interests of the working class as well as against the latter's efforts on behalf of democracy and social progress.

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THE PRICE OF SUCCESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 80-81

[Review by V. A. Voyna of the book "Kak Sozdat' Samovo Sebya. Zametki o Lyudyakh i Fil'makh Amerikanskovo Kino," (How To Create Oneself. Notes on People and Films in the American Movies) by Yan Berezintskiy, Moscow, Iskustvo , 1976, 199 pages]

[Text] This book by the Soviet critic Yan Berezintskiy may seem to be too restrictive in its scope. It reviews the creative career of a single actor, a single producer, and the fate of a single film. However, the two men and the film discussed in this book are all well above the ordinary. It speaks of Marlon Brando who, in the opinion of American critics, is the best movie actor in the U.S., and of Elia Kazan, a talented producer (not only of movies but also on the stage), and, finally, it discusses the notorious film "The Godfather." The three essays comprising this book have a common unity of concept, the "super subject." Moreover, many events in the fate of the heroes of the book are also intertwined: the leading role in "The Godfather" was played by Marlon Brando, and he also appeared in the best films of Elia Kazan. Indeed, as is shown in the book, a creative search for talented artists in American movies often runs a parallel course in many ways. As far as the basics are concerned, the book is devoted to the world of the American movies as a whole, while specifically it deals with the age-old problem of the relationship between the artist and society. The author describes attempts of these artists to serve the advanced, democratic ideals as a whole and of those disastrous and sometimes tragic compromises which they are occasionally forced to accept in order to retain the opportunity of addressing the viewers at all.

Bereznitskiy's research method is distinguished by its breadth of vision and a wide variety of argumentation. Without restricting himself to pure "motion picture science" or to an analysis of movie events as such, he turns to sociology and social psychology, cites evidence from the sociopolitical press, undertakes excursions into U.S. history and debunks the prevalent myths and stereotypes -- anything that can be described as a "cliche." Such an approach is indeed necessary, for without a detailed understanding of the specific symbolism and the reality of life in a foreign country -- which would be readily recognized by viewers in that country -- it is possible to miss some

very important characteristics in a specific motion picture and to miss its true meaning as well as its political and ideological orientation.

The film about the American mafia ("The Godfather") was an unbelievable box-office success. However, it was also interpreted by many as being very revealing and socially significant. At the same time, it seemed to please many ordinary Americans, brought up on the standard ideals of Americanism. How can one explain this dual nature of the film, and what caused it?

Authors writing for the American movies are sometimes surprised by a metamorphosis. Some specific talented and honest artist suddenly becomes involved in a film of plainly false and questionable character. How is one then to assess the overall "rating" of such an actor or producer?

The course pursued by Marlon Brando, an actor of rare talent, is not a simple one. A communist newspaper in England once described his movie image as a "symbol of protest against the orthodoxy of Americanism." He is moreover a well-known social activist, involved in problems of the blacks and of the Indian population in the U.S. His movies are permeated with a humanistic premise, seeking to "arouse the human factor in man" as the author puts it, (p 73) -- even when he creates in the film the image of a "brutal beast," such as Stanley Kowalski ("A Streetcar Named Desire").

But even this actor, who always sought to work only with progressive-minded producers and ignored cheap popularity, was unable to avoid a compromise. Indeed, "The Brando Compromise" is the title of one part of the book, in which the author analyzes the weakest films in which Brando took part. That was the price he had to pay for his success.

The book is called "How To Create Oneself" and describes the most successful careers which can inspire the idea that bourgeois society can allow a talented artist to express himself and to reward him generously. However, Brando himself once admitted: "All this, you know, is just so much sham and deceit" (p 154). The irreconcilability of the conflict between the artist and the bourgeois society -- such is the principal idea underlying the book,

Elia Kazan's creative power, too, was pretty tortuous. He was the producer, of course, who "discovered" Brando. During the "witch hunt" years that were so tragic for America's creative intellectuals, Kazan -- a man of progressive convictions -- stained his name with cowardice, by appearing, repentant, before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Since then, he has done much to regain the reputation of an honest artist and citizen. But the past is hard to forget. It sometimes reminds one of itself, and forces painful confessions about one's own "fall from grace." It is no accident that the American motion picture panorama these days occasionally reveals, as the author indicates, bitter confessions by artists of the McCarthy generation about their own past -- and the uneasy past of their country.

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VIRGINIA TEACHERS IN THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian. No 5, May 77. pp 81-82

[Review by S. A. Chervonnaya of the book "History of the Virginia Teachers Association." by J. Rupert Picott, Washington, National Education Association, 1975, 231 pages]

[Text] This book by J. R. Picott, a staff member of the National Education Association, is devoted to the history and activity of the teachers' association of the state of Virginia, which was one of the first to launch a campaign on behalf of black Americans for an education. The book covers the period between the 1880's, when the organization first came into being, and the year 1966, when the Virginia group merged with the National Teachers Association. For 22 years (from 1944 to 1966), the author was executive secretary of the Virginia Teachers Association. In his book he tells the story of how the teachers of that state, overcoming resistance of the racists, were able to win, step by step, new positions in the field of education.

Originally, the organization tried only to raise the professional qualifications of black teachers and to improve the level of instruction in black schools. However, gradually there came to the foreground the task of restructuring the entire system of school instruction of black Americans. Early in the 1920's, the association succeeded in getting the authorities to open a 4-year college for teacher training. By that time, the Virginia Teachers Association had already become the strongest teachers' group in the United States (p 73). In 1926, the mechanism, scope and scale of the association's activity were significantly expanded. During the early decades of its existence, the association was financed primarily by the members themselves, and only in individual cases was it able to gain financial support from the local authorities. Thanks to the efforts of black teachers, the educational level in the schools was improved considerably, teacher personnel was increased, the quality of instruction improved, school equipment expanded, etc.

During the 1930's, the association launched a campaign for a raise in teachers' pay as well as for an increase in the federal financing of black schools and school budgets. Its members encouraged the efforts of black students to seek an education and helped them in selecting and training for a career. The associa-

tion sought the introduction in the school programs (in both black as well as white schools) of facts dealing with the history and culture of black Americans, as well as stories about the outstanding fighters for the freeing of Negroes. In 1937, the teachers of Virginia, jointly with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, conducted a struggle for equalizing -- through legislative measures -- of the pay scales for black and white teachers. As a result, in 1940, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision to the effect that "Negro teachers are entitled to equal pay with the whites " (p 116).

With the growth of the civil rights movement for the blacks in the middle 1960's, the association actively joined the struggle for desegregation of school education in Virginia. Its members took part in the general struggle of the Afro-Americans for liquidating the segregation and discrimination legitimized in the Southern states. Reflecting the success of these efforts in the field of desegregation of school education, associations were created in Virginia in 1967 which combined black and white teachers. In the center of this struggle today, writes the author, is the achievement not of a formal but of an actual parity of black and white Americans in the sphere of education.

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THE ENERGY CRISIS: A DEBATABLE VIEW

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian. No 5, May 77 pp 82-83

[Review by A. V. Nikiforov of the book "Higher Oil Prices and the World Economy. The Adjustment Problem." edited by Edward R. Fried and Charles L. Schultze, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975, 284 pages]

[Text] The book under review is a collection of individual articles under the overall title as above. It analyzes the effect of the sharp rise in the price of oil upon the economy of the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and the developing countries, as well as upon the capitalist financial system as a whole. The authors concede that the results of quadrupling the price of oil continue to be felt by the capitalist economy. However, in their opinion, this economy "possesses, at least potentially, significant capabilities for overcoming these changes " (p 2).

As a result of the "oil crisis," the book points out, two problems have arisen which require serious attention. The first is the "management of the demand," in order to prevent a growth of unemployment and inflation because of the rise in the price of oil. The second problem is the "disproportionately greater expenditures" by those developing countries which have no oil of their own. These are the extra expenses they are forced to bear because of the rise in the cost of their imports and their own economic decline.

The sharp rise in the price of oil is stated by the authors to be the principal cause of the severe economic crisis in the developed capitalist countries. However, the authors believe that, "from a technical point of view, the adverse influence of even a very sharp and sudden rise in oil prices upon the total demand for it can be compensated for by carefully coordinated domestic policy." The authors believe that the economic policy of the developed capitalist countries in 1974 had aggravated, to a significant extent, the consequences of the higher oil prices. The authors point out that this policy was not directed toward maintaining the "total demand" but toward suppressing, at any price, the inflationary effect of the higher cost of energy upon an already "overheated" economy.

In pursuing this objective, and on the basis of the "inflationary spiral" theory of wages and prices, the principal efforts were directed toward

preventing increases in wages which would compensate for the rise in prices. As a result of the "success" of this policy, the demand for goods sharply declined, and so did production. This, in turn, resulted in increased unemployment and idle production capacity. Although by the end of 1974 the rate of inflation actually began to decline, "the cost of this policy was the worst depression in the last 30 years" (p 59).

The authors believe that in a situation such as this only a reduction in taxes -- and, hence, an increase in net income, which would compensate for higher energy costs -- could help avoid yet another twist of the inflationary spiral.

Analyzing the difficult situation in which the developing countries lacking oil of their own, find themselves, the authors note that the increased cost of importing oil not only "consumes" the greater part of their export profits, but also that the very volume of income from such exports has declined. This came as a result of the decline in demand for exports from the developing countries (usually, raw materials) by the crisis-stricken developed capitalist countries. (p 194) Subdividing the developing (non-oil-producing) countries into three basic groups according to the per capita income of their population, the authors believe that countries with a high or medium per capita income will, in many respects, be dependent upon the rate of improvement in the economy of the developed countries, where only increased production could raise the demand for the raw materials which such developing countries have for export. The increase of such exports, in turn, would raise the credit rating of these developing countries and would facilitate their securing outside credits and loans, which they find so indispensable. As for the countries with a low per capita income, the situation there, according to the authors, is rendered even more complicated, because they will have to rely exclusively upon the assistance of developed capitalist countries and members of the OPEC.

Seeing the whole energy crisis merely as a jump in the price of energy-producing raw materials, the authors assert that the problem of "adjustment" can be resolved without altering the character of the economic relationships between the developed and developing countries. Suffice it merely to increase the export of goods and services from such countries to an extent sufficient to enable them to pay the higher oil prices. Actually, however, the rise in prices is merely one of the principal external manifestations of the energy crisis which, essentially, was caused by the very nature of the capitalist economy and the crisis in the capitalist system of international division of labor. In proclaiming the member countries of the OPEC "guilty" of causing the economic crisis and aggravating the situation in the developing countries which have no oil of their own, the authors ignore the historically justifiable character of the actions taken by the OPEC countries. For all the difference in socioeconomic orientation and in specific causes which moved the OPEC countries to raise their oil prices, these actions were directed objectively toward altering the colonial-type structure of the raw material market and changing the entire complex of existing relations of unequal exchange between the industrially developed countries of the West and the developing countries. It is precisely for this reason that the OPEC countries find support from all the developing states -- including those that have no oil of their own. It is

significant that the book under review appeared on the eve of the International Conference on Economic Cooperation in Paris. While the authors did not specifically seek to draw any political conclusions, their book, nevertheless, in a way seeks to justify the policy of the Western countries, designed to split the unity of the developing countries and thus set off the OPEC countries against the other developing states in the style of the traditional imperialist policy of "divide and conquer."

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THE CRISIS OF THE CITIES AND CITIES WITHOUT CRISIS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 83-84

[Review by S. V. Bokova of the book "Cities Without Crisis" by Mike Davidov, New York, International Publishers, 1976, 240 pages]

[Text] Readers of our magazine will recall the name of Mike Davidow as the author of an article entitled "The Crisis of the Cities" which appeared in our issue No 2 for 1976. In the book under review here, the author now summarizes his observations during a 5-year stay in the Soviet Union-- from 1969 to 1974 -- as a correspondent for THE DAILY WORLD. The title of the book is no accident. Comparing Soviet cities with the American ones, the author seeks an answer to the question of how to overcome the crisis situation of many of the municipal agglomerates in the U.S. Having in mind the principal factors in the life of an American city, the author describes questions of housing construction, education, trade, crime, race discrimination, protection of the environment, and problems of public transportation.

The deplorable condition of municipal transportation and the extreme air pollution in the larger American cities have raised the question of building -- and even restoring -- the trolley-bus lines long since destroyed. This is an inexpensive, energy-saving and relatively much less air-polluting method of transportation than automobiles and autobuses, but it is almost nonexistent in the U.S. today. After World War II, General Motors, writes Davidow, actively forced off city streets any form of transportation using electricity, and it successfully achieved a situation in which motor cars became the preferred and, often, the only, means of transportation available. Railroads are another such victim of the interests of the auto makers and petroleum companies. Starting with the 1920's, railroads have come into a gradual decline. Davidow writes that between 1932 and 1956, General Motors played the principal role in destroying more than 100 railroad transit lines in 45 cities, including Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, St. Louis, and Los Angeles. (p 134) Thirty-five years ago, Southern California was the site of the world's biggest electric railroad system, the "Pacific Electric," which had 3,000 trains and annually served 80 million passengers in 56 large and small cities and towns. At the present time, the cities of Southern California, including Los Angeles, have extremely poor public transportation, because this area is under special "control" by General Motors.

Davidow compares the transport systems in the cities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He writes that the good passenger capacity, beauty and low cost of the Moscow "metro" are qualities in no way characteristic of the New York subway system. Moreover, the cost of a subway ride in New York has increased tenfold -- from 5 to 50 cents, and in Chicago the price is 55 cents, while in Moscow subway travel continues to cost 5 kopecks.

Relating the transit problem to air pollution in the cities, Davidow emphasizes that 4 million cars -- half of them made by General Motors -- have created in Los Angeles an ecologically unacceptable environment. Questions concerning the environment in the cities are closely related also to social problems. As for air pollution in the cities, according to the author, "the Soviet Union faces problems, and the U.S. -- a crisis " (p 135).

Clean air legislation passed in the U.S. in 1970 and laws dealing with water pollution, passed in 1972, have somewhat improved the situation, because they raised fines for air and water pollution violations. However, notes the author, the basic problem of how to make a monopoly respect the health and interests of the population remains unsolved as before, and it can hardly ever be solved under existing conditions. (p 110)

The crisis of the major American city agglomerates is due to the extremely slow rate of housing construction intended for the poorer citizens. John Lindsay, the former mayor of New York, promised to build, in 4 years, 160,000 apartments for low- and medium-income families. But only 9,000 such units were built. Davidow compares this with housing construction in Moscow, where 120,000 new apartments are being built annually. The very source of the trouble in one case is the secret of success in the other. Davidow justly sees it in the difference of social systems in the two cases. He notes the advantages of the socialist way of life and, at the same time, cites data reflecting the heartless exploitation by American landlords of the tenants in their apartments. (p 37) By squeezing from 25 to 30 percent of their total income from the tenants by way of rent, the landlords often refuse to provide the necessary services such as house repairs, heating, etc. and when their houses are no longer a paying proposition, the landlords simply give them up. The author writes that, annually, from 2,000 to 3,000 houses are thus being completely abandoned by their owners -- left, as it were, to the mercy of fate. As a result, he writes, some of the apartments in the cities look like "the bombed-out areas of Europe during the war." (p 44). Corruption, too, has spread deep roots in the American building industry. The results of a 6-week study in the summer of 1972 showed that the building magnates in New York spend annually 25 million dollars for bribing municipal inspectors involved in construction and insurance, as well as officials of other agencies.

The book "Cities Without Crisis" is of undoubted interest for Americans, who know virtually nothing about life in a Soviet city. However, it is also not without interest for the Soviet reader, who thus has an opportunity to recognize familiar facts as described by a foreign visitor.

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ANATOMY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY THINKING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 pp 85-86

[Review by V. A. Kremenyuk of the book "Amerikanskaya Vneshnepoliticheskaya Mysl'. Kriticheskiy Obzor Organizatsii, Metodov i Soderzhaniya Burzhuznykh Issledovaniy v SSHA po voprosam Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy i Vneshney Politiki" (American Foreign-Policy Thinking. A Critical Review of the Organization, Methods, and Content of Bourgeois Research Studies on Questions of International Relations and Foreign Policy) by V. F. Petrovskiy, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1976, 336 pages]

[Text] Improvement in Soviet-American relations is a fundamental and very essential part of the general process of detente in international relations.

This problem is the subject of the book under review, authored by the well-known Soviet scholar and internationalist. The book's special trait is the author's profound knowledge of the subject and the fact that he realizes the exceptional importance of analyzing U.S. foreign-policy thinking for resolving various practical foreign-policy problems and, specifically, those involving Soviet-American relations.

Examining the basic characteristics of the existing politico-academic complex in the U.S., Petrovskiy reveals the essence of the entire range of relations between the "free" scientific community and government organizations -- a relationship concealed in official U.S. government documents under the term of "partnership between science and practice." (pp 9-10). The author draws the important conclusion that the existing U.S. system of managing the bourgeois science of international relations is effective enough "to influence the development of numerous scholarly" schools of thought and trends in the direction of conformism and to insure the dominant position in science of the point of view supported -- or, even, inspired -- from above. (p 57)

Examining specific elements in the basic trends of U.S. foreign-policy thinking, Petrovskiy writes: "The class orientation of American foreign-policy concepts also presupposed, along with the continuity of these essential concepts, an ability of these concepts, and of recommended forms and methods for carrying out foreign policy, to adapt themselves to the constant changes in the system of

international relations." (pp 182-183). Such an approach enables the author to use his original and eminently practical classification of various U.S. foreign policy concepts in order to examine their content in terms of their functional objectives, which reflect the American assessment of the relationship of forces on the international stage and perspectives for worldwide understanding, as well as the theories and concepts serving as the basis for pretensions to American leadership of the capitalist world and concepts offering a choice of platforms and means for a global struggle.

The author carefully examines the reaction of leading American political scientists to the concrete changes in the world relationship of forces. He notes that although, on the whole, their postulates designed to use certain new factors in international relations for the benefit of the American ruling class, are unrealistic, nevertheless there has also occurred, in American science, a certain retreat from the idea of a "Pax Americana" in favor of common sense. (p 233)

At the same time Petrovskiy also defines, with adequate precision, the borderline in the evolution of American foreign-policy thinking, which the interests of the ruling class will not permit anyone to overstep. One thing at least is clear, he writes, and that is that "the present approach of American bourgeois theoreticians to the question of providing the means for a global counter-struggle under present-day conditions, is evidence of the bankruptcy of the former methods and forms of the struggle..." (p 277).

The evaluation of the principles of the basic direction in the evolution of American foreign policy theories and concepts as given in Petrovskiy's book enables the reader to recognize not only the plainly negative factors involved, as determined by the class interests of the American bourgeoisie, but also a number of positive elements which have appeared in the foreign policy thinking of American political scientists under the pressure of objective changes in the surrounding world. The author shows convincingly how some of the most rationally thinking scholars and specialists in the U.S., while generally remaining on the positions of the bourgeoisie, nevertheless support the idea of detente and peaceful coexistence. (pp 277-279)

The anatomy of the foreign-policy thinking in the U.S., as presented in Petrovskiy's book, can provide valuable assistance to anyone interested in the problems of foreign policy of the U.S., the mechanism whereby it is developed, and the attitude toward questions of foreign policy and international relations on the part of the American scholarly community.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77 p 86

[Text] Dear Readers: In our issue No 9 for 1976, the editors included a questionnaire which we asked the readers to fill out, answering a number of questions dealing with the work of our magazine, the thematics of the material chosen for publication, and its evaluation.

In the past months, we received a large number of completed questionnaires and letters. The wishes, suggestions, and critical comments contained therein will be of great help to us in our future work.

We cordially thank everyone who responded to our request.

THE EDITORS

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CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 87-98

[Continuation of serialized translation of excerpts of the book "Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy," published by the Center for Defense Information, edited by David T. Johnson and Barry R. Schneider, New York, Praeger, 1976]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CANADA: THE STATE AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 99-110

[Article by B. I. Alekhin]

[Summary] The 1970's have marked a new stage in the formation of the Canadian Government's scientific policy. The government has made intensive efforts to work out principles and methods of state regulation in the sphere of science and technology to make the nation less dependent on the United States, to give national capital the ability to compete in the international technological race and to make science a decisive factor of economic growth.

In most of the developed capitalist countries, the budget for scientific and technical development is divided approximately equally between commercial development and scientific research. But Canada only spends around 25 percent of this budget on commercial development. This emphasis on research which is not directly related to the demands of production or the market reflects the traditional dependence of Canadian industry on imported technology, primarily from the United States. This means that the structural characteristics of Canada's scientific potential are quite imperfect from the standpoint of the effect of scientific and technical development on economic growth, labor productivity, product quality and product variety.

In spite of this, the average annual increase in Canadian national income during the last 15 years has been higher than in the United States and the EEC, and in terms of labor productivity, Canada is second only to the United States. The relatively rapid economic growth of the country has not been due to Canadian efforts in the sphere of science and technology, but to its deep involvement in international--or, more precisely, continental--division of labor. In exchange for raw materials, Canada receives the latest technology and equipment from the United States. As a result, Canadian industry's own scientific and technical base is quite underdeveloped.

Canadian national capital is no longer satisfied with this. The representatives of this capital no longer wish to increase profits through the exploitation of their natural resources, but through scientific and technical progress. They are hoping that this will also raise labor productivity and increase the potential of their processing industry to the maximum.

One important indicator of Canada's dependence on imported technology may be found in the number of Canadian patents issued to Canadians. In 1975, 20,700 patents were issued, but only 1,300 (6.5 percent) were issued to Canadian citizens. A completely opposite situation may be seen in the other developed capitalist nations. Another peculiarity of Canadian scientific development is the fact that the nation makes a relatively large contribution to world science through the research of its state and university laboratories, but plays a negligible role in the international technological race due to the fact that its industry is not involved in this process to any significant degree. It is too difficult to develop research and engineering within Canadian industry, since Canadian firms are mainly dependent on foreign capital.

Just as the other developed capitalist nations, Canada entered the 1970's with several acute problems, arising from the scientific and technical revolution, and has done a great deal to study and solve these problems. As a result, the government has become much more involved in science and technology. The government is trying to foresee the consequences of scientific development and to adjust them in the interests of Canadian capital. But the capitalist economic system reduces government scientific policy to isolated measures which are carried out in relation to narrow departmental concerns and the commercial interests of private capital. The government funds which are used to finance such measures are redistributed to corporations and highly paid white-collar workers, while the common laborers pay for the failure and inefficiency of the state's scientific policy.

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SOLAR ENERGY PROGRAMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 110-121

[Article by Ye. A. Lebedeva, P. A. Nedotko and A. F. Shakay]

[Summary] The development of solar energy systems has recently been given a great deal of consideration in the United States. The sun is an abundant source of energy which is accessible to all nations, does not pollute the environment, is not depleted as a result of use and can be used with complete safety. According to the estimates of American specialists, there is enough solar energy just in 0.5 percent of U.S. territory to satisfy the nation's expected total demand for energy in the year 2000.

As early as 1952, during the Truman Administration, a special congressional committee proposed that more research be conducted on solar energy. According to the committee's prediction, the United States would have been able to satisfy 10 percent of its demand for energy with the use of solar systems by 1975. But the problem was not given a great deal of consideration until the 1970's, when the energy and ecological crises became acute and were accompanied by a sharp rise in fuel prices, a reduction in natural fuel reserves, increased environmental pollution and other factors. During 1974-1976, the United States was not able to increase its production of primary energy resources within the nation. In fact, production decreased. This made the economy more dependent on imported oil. In 1976, the United States imported more than 40 percent of the oil it used.

According to the latest estimates of the federal government, solar energy systems can cover 2 percent of the nation's demand for energy by 1985 and from 10 to 30 percent by 2000. The most promising field for the application of solar energy is the heating and air-conditioning of buildings. Almost 25 percent of all of the energy used in the United States is used for these purposes. Even if only one-third of the traditional fuel resources used in this field were to be replaced by solar energy, the nation would save around 6 billion dollars a year. The new plans for residences with built-in solar energy systems are expected to provide the average homeowner with a savings of 80 percent in his energy expenses.

Many technical institutes and universities have become involved in the research on solar energy. They are setting up special laboratories and scientific centers, teaching new courses and training specialists in this new field. All of this attests to the broad scope of the work being done to develop solar energy systems, even though this source of energy will probably not play an important role in the energy balance of the United States until the 21st century.

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ENGINEERING EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 122-125

[Article by V. V. Sokolov]

[Summary] The period from the mid-1950's to the beginning of the 1970's was the "golden age" of the American university system. During this time, 400 new universities and colleges were opened in the nation and the number of students increased by 130 percent, while the college-age population only increased by 50 percent. The number of individuals graduating with a bachelor's degree doubled and the number of those graduating with a master's degree and a doctorate tripled. The size of the teaching, research and administrative staff of higher educational institutions tripled.

But this "golden age" did not last long. The economic crisis which overtook the country at the beginning of the 1970's also affected the educational system. Many schools were closed and the rate of increase in student enrollments was much lower than it had been. It became difficult for young specialists to find jobs. The rate of unemployment among engineers rose from 0.8 percent in 1969 to 3 percent in 1975. According to statistics for 1975, 20 percent of the graduates of technical colleges were not able to find jobs in their specialty that year.

American scholars like to say that the higher educational institutions in the United States are completely independent and are not controlled by the government. But facts attest to the opposite. During the 1970's, annual federal budget allocations for scientific research programs in higher educational institutions have amounted to an average of more than 1.5 million dollars per technical institute. These huge sums make the educational institutions accountable to government agencies. The higher school's relations with private companies are also being broadened. During the 1970's, advisory councils were set up to promote cooperation between the educational institutions and private corporations.

By developing closer and broader ties with the government and private sector of the economy, the system of higher education has also acquired some of

their defects: Uneven development, the consequences of inflation (a constant rise in tuition costs and the resulting elite nature of education), greater dependence on the arbitrary dictates of monopolies, the absence of a job placement system, unemployment among young specialists, the militarization of research programs, etc. On the whole, the American higher school is acquiring an increasingly contradictory nature and is depending more and more on the general state of the nation's economy.

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PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 77
pp 126-127

[Summary] Prince Edward Island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence is the smallest of the Canadian provinces. It had a population of around 120,000 in 1976. The capital of the province is Charlottetown. It was discovered by Jacques Cartier in 1534 during his first trip to Canada. In 1603 it was annexed by France as Ile St. Jean. After the Seven Years War it was ceded to Britain in 1763 and remained part of Nova Scotia until it became a separate colony in 1769. It did not join the Confederation of Canada until 1873.

Weather conditions here are milder than on the neighboring mainland provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Annual precipitation is around 1,100 millimeters. The soil is not particularly fertile and is used mainly for the cultivation of potatoes. It is the most densely populated Canadian province (21 persons per square kilometer). Its ethnic composition is not as varied as that of most of the other provinces. According to the 1971 census, 92 percent of the population was English-speaking. It is the only Canadian province in which the rural population exceeds the urban (62 percent in 1971).

The economy of Prince Edward Island is one of the most underdeveloped in Canada. The per capita income is 30 percent lower than the nationwide level. Potatoes, fisheries and the tourist trade account for the major share of the island's economy.

Since 1966, the provincial government has been headed by the Liberals. Prince Edward Island is represented by eight seats in the Federal Senate and four in the House of Commons.

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